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John Greenewald: His name is
John Ramirez. A retired CIA

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officer, John spent 25 years
with the agency specializing in

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ballistic missile defense
systems. And signals analysis of

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weapon system radars. And along
the way, he's learned some stuff

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that he now feels he wants to
share with the world. And

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John Ramirez: then we have what
appears to be balls of energy.

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That's the best way I can
describe it, that people have

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also seen,

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John Greenewald: but he is no
whistleblower. The information

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he's about to share comes after
a CIA Review of the information

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he wants to convey. And they
gave their approval that John

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can talk about at all. This
doesn't mean the CIA endorses

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his information, but rather, it
was reviewed by the CIA to

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ensure no classified information
is given to you or me. So what

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does he want to share that the
CIA is okay with? Well, how

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about knowledge about a working
group within the intelligence

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community studying orbs? Or how
about the reality that

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internally, CIA personnel within
the agency talked about UFO

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related events? And yes, so much
more,

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John Ramirez: I saw my orb.

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John Greenewald: Stay tuned,
you're about to journey inside

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the black vault.

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That's right, everybody. As
always, thank you so much for

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tuning in. And taking this
journey inside the black vault

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with me. I'm your host, John
Greenwald, Jr. and I've got a

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very special guest today,
someone that I've wanted to talk

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to on this program for quite
some time, he has definitely

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popped onto the scene here and
has done quite a few interviews,

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and a very popular guest where
he appears, and rightfully so

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he's got a lot of information to
share. John Ramirez. John, thank

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you so much for joining me on
the program and taking a little

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bit of time with me in my
audience. Well, John,

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John Ramirez: thank you for
having me. And so your audience

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might be interested to know a
little backstory. When I was

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attending some of these UFO
conferences with a colleague of

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mine. You were waiting to go on
stage. And we actually talked to

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you when you're like very young,
many, you know, I believe it

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will say conference in Orange
County, you That's right. As for

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Orange County, and when you went
up on stage to do your

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presentation, he and I looked at
each other kind of smiled and

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said, you know, that guy really
needs to talk to us. And here I

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am talking to you. So I consider
that as a circle that was close.

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360 degrees, we close that
circle, with my appearance with

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you.

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John Greenewald: Yeah. And I'm
excited about it. I was was

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surprised when you had reminded
me because I remember, I if you

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recall where we were standing.
If I was on stage, it was to the

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right before I went on. And when
you guys had approached me, and

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you had mentioned CIA? I did
hope I didn't show it to you.

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But I think I started sweating a
little bit going, why aren't

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people from the CIA here, you
know, waiting to watch me go up

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on stage. But I'm glad you
reminded me. And that was quite

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a few years ago, like I said,
and it's great to have you on

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the program and be able to pick
your brain now that you have

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retired from your 25 year career
in the CIA, and have decided to

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come out and start talking
openly about topics that I would

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say not a whole lot of CIA
agents personnel like to talk

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about and let me ask you, I
wanted to ask you before the

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show, what is an accurate term
for you? Were you an agent or

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were you a employee? What's
what's what's proper?

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John Ramirez: Well, we're not
agents. There are no agents in

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CIA. We hire agents, their
foreign nationals, that for a

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compensation could be monetary
goods and services. They agree

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to spy against their own
government because they have

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access into their own government
and provide us with information.

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And so that is a major reason
why there's so much secrecy and

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a lot of our most valuable
intelligence sources are people

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who, if the information was
known publicly, and only, like a

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very few people would have that
information in his or her

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country, their lives will be at
stake. And so that's a very

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precarious situation for them
and for us, because exposes our

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sources, it may expose other
sources if they interrogate this

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person. And also the method of
extraction method sources and

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methods, the method of
extraction becomes very fragile,

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we won't be able to use that
extraction method ever again.

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And so that's why a lot of the
secrecy occurs. And so it's not

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like we're hiding information.
It's more like, we need to

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protect these sources of
methods, because we may want to

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use the source, again, or other
sources, and we need to protect

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how we get information out of
that country, an adversarial

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country, to the United States.
And so that's that type of

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person is an agent. I see. No,

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John Greenewald: no. How would
you describe yourself?

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John Ramirez: Officers?
Officers, guys, officers? Yeah.

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So operations officers, analytic
officers, Science and Technology

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Officers, it could be logistics
officers, you name it. I gotcha.

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The full gamut of all of our
positions, were just officers.

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John Greenewald: So I want to
talk a little bit, just for a

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couple minutes about what you
did for the CIA. I spoke a

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little bit about it in the
introduction, everybody just

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saw, but as I just mentioned, 25
years, you were quite busy in

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that in that timeframe. Give me
a nutshell version about those

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25 years if you can, and what
did you do for the for the CIA?

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John Ramirez: Okay, so what I
can talk about is signals

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intelligence. Everyone knows
that the National Security

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Agency does analysts
intelligence, their the

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functional mission manager, the
director of NSA, what we call

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danza is the functional Mission
Manager for signals

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intelligence, CIA does human
intelligence or human and open

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source intelligence, oh cent.
And so that's our, that's our

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focus. But within the CIA, there
are other capabilities that are

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also capabilities and other
agencies. But the focus of our

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capabilities is to support
operations. So from a citizen

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telogen standpoint, our second
officers deploy to protect

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operations, they may do counter
surveillance, they may provide

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gadgets, in order to do some of
that extraction that I talked

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about is highly sensitive. So in
my role, I did electronic

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intelligence, and electronic
intelligence is the analysis of

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weapons related radar signals,
missile seekers, air defense

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radar systems associated with
larger weapon systems. And so we

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would like collect signals and
analyze them in a lab

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to get the internals of that
signal. When I mean by

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internals, we want to reverse
engineer that radar just based

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on the signals that we collect.
And any photographs may we may

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have, of the source, the radar
antennas, for example, we can

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measure, combined with the
signals combined with other

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information provided by our
overhead reconnaissance systems

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of how much power that we
collected. And together, we can

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then model that radar system.
And that information goes to a

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weapon systems analyst who's
looking at for example, if it's

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a surface to air missile system,
we might do the radar signals

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analysis for that system. And
they may do the interceptor, the

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actual shooting in of that
weapon system, combining our

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data with the interceptor data,
they'll have a better picture of

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that system. Now dia does the
same thing. Dia has the missile

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and space Intelligence Center in
Huntsville, Alabama. They also

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have a lab and they do the same
thing. So what's the difference?

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Well, the DIA is more interested
in an adversarial system

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performance against what we have
in inventory. So when we look at

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a system, we're looking at the
nuts and bolts and the internals

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of a system that is probably
just being developed so they

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don't have like hundreds of them
scattered over a country that

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would have just like one or two
that they're working on, and

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they test. But dia looks at the
entire deployed system, what

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they call the electronic order
of battle. All the emanations

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coming from deployed systems.
And they model against what

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we're flying because they need
to inform policymakers. This

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adversary has a new surface air
missile system. And its

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performance is this. And we
have, let's say, the F two F 22,

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F 35 fighter planes. And we know
the, the performance of those

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fighter planes. And they have to
model and simulate what our

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planes can do against that
system, or what that system can

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do against our planes. So the
DIA does that type of work in

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great detail. And dia reports,
you know, you heard dirts,

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there's just like a few pages, a
DUI Defense Intelligence Report

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from the DIA, I see hundreds and
hundreds of pages. And that's

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one of the things that the IA
doesn't like to release. And

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it's probably not foreseeable.
Because it's extremely

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sensitive, because it reveals
our capabilities. It reveals

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those capabilities that we need
to work on in order to counter a

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weapon system that's deployed.
And what we provide is weapon

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systems that are going to be
deployed, so that they can cue

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up the acquisition side of the
department saying, Okay, this

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adversary has this weapon system
are our counter to that isn't as

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good, we need to either improve
that weapon system or build a

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new one. And so that's the
relationship of what we do

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versus let's NSA and dia. But we
do have a lab. And surprisingly,

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every September is family day.
So the family members who are

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uncleared to children, close
relatives, of staff members and

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contractors invite their family
members uncleared to tour the

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CIA, they practically have the
full run of the house, as long

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as they're escorted by a badged
officer or a batch contractor.

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And so here's my top secret SCI
lab and I would giving tours of

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my lab, and putting up
demonstrations, pumping in

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signals to simulate a radar
system, and just showing how we

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do things. So in a way, it's
highly secret. But in a way,

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it's it's not the fact of it's
not secret. So

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John Greenewald: you know, John,
I could have happily have been

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your son that day, when we would
go in there and no, that's

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fascinating. And and one of the
other job titles that stuck out

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to me, which is one thing I want
to deal with, before we we move

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on from your background, is that
you were a founding member of

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the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence is

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national counterproliferation
center or NC PC. Yeah. I believe

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that the history of that office
began at CIA then was moved. Is

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that that correct? ODNI?

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John Ramirez: Well, it's one of
the offices that reside both at

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CIA and at the ODNI level at
CIA. It's the

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counterproliferation division
underneath the director of

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operations. And in fact, the
most infamous member of that

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division, we all know, what's
Valerie Plame? She worked for

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CP, I worked for NCPC at the
ODNI level where we have

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counterproliferation efforts
throughout the government. And

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we were coordinating the United
States government's response to

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the tear, to stop proliferation
of nuclear materials. And we

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were making sure that at the
policy, not the operational

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level at the policy level, that
we weren't doing things that

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were redundant, that we were
like providing resources to them

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be advocates for resources to
these other CP organizations,

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such as at the FBI, national
security branch, there is a CP

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division at NSA, in a
directorate called S director

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for cygan. And in a
subdirectory, called s two,

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which is analysis and
production, there is a office of

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counter proliferation. So
there's just two examples of

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other counter proliferation
efforts. So we want to make sure

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that we don't redundantly, like
provide capabilities, that when

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we build something for the CP
equity, that everyone has access

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to it, and they all can provide
inputs into that capability. So

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that when we buy that capability
through in our role, for

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example, with a defense
contractor, let's say it's

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Lockheed Martin Building a
satellite or something like

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that, that all of their equities
are addressed in that sensor

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system. And all the capabilities
they want that to do so we

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brokered that kind of like, and
I could speak on the second

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aside, and we also have biology
and nuclear as the other parts

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of NBC.

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John Greenewald: Yeah. Valerie
Plame is a name I haven't heard

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in quite a few years. It's
funny, bring her up, and you

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refreshed my memory on a couple
FOIA cases that I had many, many

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years ago. But that's a
different show in itself. So So

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let me ask you, somebody who's
involved in that type of work

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and weapons systems. And
obviously, you answered one of

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my other questions already. Your
lab was top secret SCI. So you

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were highly cleared at these
levels? It's kind of obvious.

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But you know, just to set that
up, how do you have a focus like

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that with the CIA, and wind up
at UFO conferences? And you, you

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know, showed up at my at one of
the, you know, my appearances?

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What's that bridge? What got you
into the UFO side of this? Was

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it anything official or
personal?

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John Ramirez: Well, first of
all, let me preface I don't

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remember, we identified as CIA,
I think because of the way we

222
00:16:01,740 --> 00:16:05,040
behaved, you might have some
ISIS, the CIA,

223
00:16:05,070 --> 00:16:06,690
John Greenewald: you might be
right. But to be honest with

224
00:16:06,690 --> 00:16:11,250
you, I could have maybe I could
absolutely be wrong, and maybe I

225
00:16:11,250 --> 00:16:17,190
picked up on it. But I remember
being nervous. Like, why are

226
00:16:17,190 --> 00:16:20,430
they in? And again, maybe it was
just an assumption on my part.

227
00:16:21,090 --> 00:16:23,610
So yeah, forgive me if I miss
remembered that part.

228
00:16:23,850 --> 00:16:28,590
John Ramirez: Yeah, we would not
identify CIA and a sec to your

229
00:16:28,620 --> 00:16:34,890
question. We went there, because
we were personally interested.

230
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And you follow it. So my friend
and I, we were both

231
00:16:39,510 --> 00:16:45,210
experiencers. And we both had
sightings. And so we had an

232
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interest. But having that
interest in CIA was not

233
00:16:48,150 --> 00:16:53,550
official, both of us we informed
CIA officer security, the fact

234
00:16:53,550 --> 00:16:56,460
that we're going to this
conference, the hotels were

235
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staying at the flights were
taking, and, and to verify that

236
00:17:01,380 --> 00:17:04,770
we're paying for everything, the
flights, the hotels and the

237
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conference fees out of out of
pocket, as long as they know

238
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where we at. They didn't care
where we went. And it's within

239
00:17:12,900 --> 00:17:16,500
CONUS. So it's not like we're
traveling overseas. Sure. So

240
00:17:16,500 --> 00:17:21,090
that makes it a lot easier. So
it was a personal interest. And

241
00:17:21,300 --> 00:17:27,210
many people at CIA who worked in
other areas, not even close to

242
00:17:27,240 --> 00:17:31,230
the weapons intelligence area I
worked. But in other areas, were

243
00:17:31,230 --> 00:17:36,420
also hobbyists, I would say, of
the entire topic. And I know

244
00:17:36,420 --> 00:17:40,320
that because I was an
administrator of a discussion

245
00:17:40,380 --> 00:17:44,820
database, and Lotus Notes, which
really dates the technology, IBM

246
00:17:44,820 --> 00:17:48,690
Lotus Notes, and they had little
discussion database areas within

247
00:17:48,690 --> 00:17:54,690
Lotus Notes. And one of them is
called the users group, th U G,

248
00:17:54,750 --> 00:17:59,430
and we put a little s, it is
pronounced thugs. And all of a

249
00:17:59,430 --> 00:18:03,630
sudden, a lot of folks who
served my time will remember Oh,

250
00:18:03,630 --> 00:18:06,630
that's that John Ramirez from
thugs, because I was one of the

251
00:18:06,630 --> 00:18:09,750
administrators and I used to
contribute a lot into the

252
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computer hobbyists that used to
post in that particular data

253
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discussion base. But one of the
topics was like what DNI,

254
00:18:22,830 --> 00:18:27,360
Abraham's calls the other topic.
And so we had a catch all of

255
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things that we just contributed.
And that's where a lot of people

256
00:18:32,190 --> 00:18:39,660
talked about the Anunnaki, the
monuments on Mars, anomalies on

257
00:18:39,660 --> 00:18:42,780
the on Mars and the Moon and
things like that are mostly

258
00:18:42,780 --> 00:18:46,920
speculative in nature. I brought
up the remote viewing program,

259
00:18:48,180 --> 00:18:51,930
and MK Ultra, and all these
things that we all know from

260
00:18:51,960 --> 00:18:57,930
foils that CIA was involved in,
we just discussed it at that

261
00:18:57,930 --> 00:19:00,360
level. And it's supposed to be
on classified. So we're not

262
00:19:00,360 --> 00:19:03,690
going to put anything in there
of a current operation or

263
00:19:03,690 --> 00:19:07,140
current capability. Yeah, it's
more historical looking back and

264
00:19:07,140 --> 00:19:13,920
personal, personal experiences.
And so in that context, that's

265
00:19:13,920 --> 00:19:19,290
how I was able to interface with
that entire topic at an

266
00:19:19,290 --> 00:19:22,440
unofficial level. But having
said that, I got phone calls on

267
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the secure line, that what CIA
officers are know the green

268
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phone, so I say green phone,
they know exactly what phone was

269
00:19:30,510 --> 00:19:34,770
ringing. The green phone rang
and people will tell me about

270
00:19:35,370 --> 00:19:39,060
certain things that they
witnessed in the course of their

271
00:19:39,060 --> 00:19:41,700
careers, or even some in the
course of their military

272
00:19:41,700 --> 00:19:45,990
careers. For example, the strong
association with Navy and the

273
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phenomenon. One CIA officer
called me up and say, yeah, when

274
00:19:49,800 --> 00:19:55,590
I was on the USS Boston, and
we're off the coast of Vietnam,

275
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we had to fight off a UFO. My
ship went to German quarters and

276
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we fought off a UFO. And I
looked at the deployment of that

277
00:20:04,410 --> 00:20:09,810
ship. And where we're when that
ship was off the coast of

278
00:20:09,810 --> 00:20:14,790
Vietnam. The Gulf of Tonkin, or
what they call Yankee station.

279
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There was nothing there that
would even hint at that

280
00:20:19,530 --> 00:20:23,850
occurring. I looked at the
cruise, the cruise books at Navy

281
00:20:23,850 --> 00:20:27,810
people know that when you go on
like a cruise into the Pacific

282
00:20:27,840 --> 00:20:31,620
West packs or to the Met the Met
cruises, that there's a cruise

283
00:20:31,620 --> 00:20:35,490
book Lord, I got high school
annual. And I looked in there

284
00:20:35,490 --> 00:20:38,040
for any incidence of anything
strange occur. And of course,

285
00:20:38,040 --> 00:20:41,070
that's not going to be in there.
He affirmed that. Yeah, that

286
00:20:41,070 --> 00:20:44,910
happened. And so in that level,
that's where I got involved with

287
00:20:45,750 --> 00:20:48,930
some what personal as well as
semi official.

288
00:20:50,670 --> 00:20:53,130
John Greenewald: Let's talk
about the semi official. Were

289
00:20:53,130 --> 00:20:56,550
you able to peek anybody's
interest internally with the CIA

290
00:20:56,550 --> 00:20:59,910
about these types of reports
that you were getting through

291
00:21:00,060 --> 00:21:03,570
through the thugs? Through the
from the from your fellow thugs?

292
00:21:04,110 --> 00:21:06,750
Were you able to get people to
be interested or what happened

293
00:21:06,750 --> 00:21:07,200
with that?

294
00:21:07,500 --> 00:21:09,660
John Ramirez: Well, I think
they're like already interested.

295
00:21:09,660 --> 00:21:13,380
And I met some of them for
lunch. And we talked about it

296
00:21:13,410 --> 00:21:18,000
like at lunch, going to the
cafeteria. And we could talk

297
00:21:18,000 --> 00:21:21,270
about it because it was
personal, like experiences. Now,

298
00:21:21,450 --> 00:21:25,140
there is no classified
discussion at any cafeteria

299
00:21:25,320 --> 00:21:30,060
tour. In the intelligence
community. It's unclassified. So

300
00:21:30,060 --> 00:21:34,170
we can't get into details about,
you know, the professional side

301
00:21:34,710 --> 00:21:40,770
of what we might have worked on.
But it's all personal anecdotes

302
00:21:40,800 --> 00:21:46,080
of what we experienced
ourselves. So at that level,

303
00:21:46,080 --> 00:21:51,300
yes, I was able to like, have a
group of people just getting

304
00:21:51,300 --> 00:21:55,260
together at lunch on our own
time because lunches our own

305
00:21:55,260 --> 00:22:00,090
time, and not doing doing it
this during government hours,

306
00:22:00,120 --> 00:22:01,860
the eight hours we're we're
working.

307
00:22:03,450 --> 00:22:05,670
John Greenewald: Is that what
you refer to as the semi

308
00:22:05,670 --> 00:22:07,290
official aspect of it?

309
00:22:07,559 --> 00:22:09,989
John Ramirez: Right? The semi
official came from those

310
00:22:09,989 --> 00:22:13,289
discussions. Plus when I got on
the green phone, I gotcha.

311
00:22:13,589 --> 00:22:17,939
John Greenewald: Yeah. Which is
fascinating. And I took notes

312
00:22:17,939 --> 00:22:23,129
about the USS Boston and Vietnam
and the Gulf of Tonkin. But are

313
00:22:23,129 --> 00:22:27,989
there any other incidents that
you received through the green

314
00:22:27,989 --> 00:22:31,229
phone or elsewhere, that stick
out to you as being something

315
00:22:31,229 --> 00:22:35,639
that is not very well known or
known at all in the UFO field,

316
00:22:35,639 --> 00:22:38,459
but something that on an
official level? Or excuse me,

317
00:22:38,459 --> 00:22:44,129
from your time in the CIA, that
you heard about? Anything that

318
00:22:44,129 --> 00:22:44,909
sticks out to you?

319
00:22:45,240 --> 00:22:47,970
John Ramirez: Well, I've already
talked about this in my previous

320
00:22:48,330 --> 00:22:52,740
appearances about the or working
group. And I

321
00:22:52,740 --> 00:22:54,600
John Greenewald: want to get
into that, yeah. So that's a

322
00:22:54,600 --> 00:22:57,780
perfect transition. So what
exactly is this orb Working

323
00:22:57,780 --> 00:22:58,230
Group?

324
00:22:58,859 --> 00:23:04,229
John Ramirez: Well, let's say
that before any huge program is

325
00:23:04,229 --> 00:23:08,639
launched. And a program is
something that requires dollars

326
00:23:08,639 --> 00:23:12,839
and cents to fund it requires a
facility requires contractor

327
00:23:12,839 --> 00:23:16,799
support, administrative support,
logistics, support, all of that,

328
00:23:16,829 --> 00:23:21,749
that that's real money. Before
that occurs, there's always

329
00:23:21,749 --> 00:23:26,549
like, offline before that
occurs, pre program, people

330
00:23:26,549 --> 00:23:30,029
getting together to kind of
bound the problem, like what

331
00:23:30,149 --> 00:23:34,529
what are we looking at? What are
we dealing with? And how do we

332
00:23:35,039 --> 00:23:39,779
approach this issue? So the
world working group started

333
00:23:39,779 --> 00:23:44,639
when, and I can say this,
because the existence of orbs

334
00:23:44,849 --> 00:23:49,169
was officially disclosed. And
James SLoCaT skis skinwalkers,

335
00:23:49,169 --> 00:23:54,449
in the Pentagon book, but we did
see orbs, much like what they

336
00:23:54,449 --> 00:23:59,519
saw associated with a lot of the
anecdotes from eyewitnesses in

337
00:23:59,519 --> 00:24:02,579
that book, so we saw orbs, and
these were,

338
00:24:02,609 --> 00:24:04,379
John Greenewald: if I can
interject, and I don't mean to

339
00:24:04,379 --> 00:24:08,339
John, just can you give a very
brief definition? I know what an

340
00:24:08,339 --> 00:24:12,599
orb is. And I'm sure my does
other members. Yeah, in the

341
00:24:12,599 --> 00:24:15,299
context of how you're referring
to it what what is an orb?

342
00:24:15,569 --> 00:24:19,799
John Ramirez: Okay, so we have
structural craft, the nuts and

343
00:24:19,799 --> 00:24:25,319
bolts metallic craft that people
have seen throughout the history

344
00:24:25,319 --> 00:24:31,109
of ufology and then we have what
appears to be, but also of

345
00:24:31,109 --> 00:24:35,219
energy. That's the best way I
can describe it. That people

346
00:24:35,219 --> 00:24:38,549
have also seen those are the
orbs I'm talking about, okay.

347
00:24:38,639 --> 00:24:42,599
And so, we said well, people
have seen these all along, but

348
00:24:42,659 --> 00:24:50,219
from officially some of these
orbs cannot be seen. Unless you

349
00:24:50,249 --> 00:24:54,149
look at a spectrum outside of
light, or actually below light

350
00:24:54,149 --> 00:24:59,009
infrared is being below light
below red. And when that we have

351
00:24:59,009 --> 00:25:03,449
these capabilities Built into
some of our spacecraft and turn

352
00:25:03,449 --> 00:25:08,519
them on, we are looking for,
like launch detection. That's

353
00:25:08,519 --> 00:25:13,169
its primary function. We're also
looking for what's known as

354
00:25:13,169 --> 00:25:19,889
change detection, we might be
looking at a field that might be

355
00:25:19,889 --> 00:25:24,119
used for narcotics production.
And we want to know what changes

356
00:25:24,119 --> 00:25:27,149
may have occurred over a period
of time over that field. And

357
00:25:27,149 --> 00:25:31,949
that gives them an idea of what
might be going on. So that's,

358
00:25:31,979 --> 00:25:36,509
that's the day job, if you will,
of those sensors. What happened

359
00:25:36,509 --> 00:25:41,909
was outside of that day job of
doing just normal intelligence

360
00:25:41,909 --> 00:25:45,539
collection, all of a sudden,
they saw these balls of light.

361
00:25:46,439 --> 00:25:51,629
And it wasn't like an anomaly,
to the sense that what NASA

362
00:25:51,659 --> 00:25:56,879
explains as dust or you know,
particles or whatever, NASA lens

363
00:25:56,879 --> 00:26:01,829
flare, it wasn't that. And so it
was something that was a

364
00:26:01,829 --> 00:26:11,069
tangible phenomenon. But not the
can't be explained. And so

365
00:26:11,219 --> 00:26:14,009
originally, you know, when you
get something like that, you

366
00:26:14,009 --> 00:26:17,519
want to filter it out. Because
it's noise based on like, what

367
00:26:17,519 --> 00:26:19,379
you're really looking at, you
don't want any of the noise

368
00:26:19,379 --> 00:26:22,919
there. So you want to like get
rid of it from the data,

369
00:26:23,249 --> 00:26:25,499
subtract it from the data,
because you just want to look at

370
00:26:25,529 --> 00:26:31,139
your target. Well, this kept
appearing over and over. And it

371
00:26:31,139 --> 00:26:34,229
wasn't over the United States,
because we don't turn on these

372
00:26:34,229 --> 00:26:37,919
sensors over the United States
and a national technical means

373
00:26:37,919 --> 00:26:43,319
sensors are not collecting
against the United States. It's

374
00:26:43,319 --> 00:26:48,089
an adversary. And so over
adversary airspace and space,

375
00:26:48,419 --> 00:26:51,659
here comes these these
anomalies, and they kept

376
00:26:51,659 --> 00:26:55,679
happening to the point where,
okay, now we got to pay

377
00:26:55,679 --> 00:26:59,159
attention to this. We got to pay
more attention to this because

378
00:26:59,159 --> 00:27:03,509
this isn't something that is
just a random occurrence. This

379
00:27:03,509 --> 00:27:09,989
is something that is almost like
a, a tangible manifestation of

380
00:27:09,989 --> 00:27:12,839
something we don't understand.
So let's get the working group

381
00:27:12,839 --> 00:27:14,789
together. And so

382
00:27:14,790 --> 00:27:16,620
John Greenewald: what year What
year was this going on?

383
00:27:18,390 --> 00:27:24,480
John Ramirez: The the best I can
say is, if you look at

384
00:27:24,480 --> 00:27:29,670
Wikipedia, and you can now
search for k h 11. They give you

385
00:27:29,670 --> 00:27:33,120
all the blocks, block one, block
two, block three, block four,

386
00:27:33,120 --> 00:27:40,530
block five, block two, in the
early 90s was when the KH 11. A

387
00:27:40,560 --> 00:27:46,110
optical sensor taking pictures
also included an infrared

388
00:27:46,860 --> 00:27:53,610
payload is the KH 11 is an
electro optical sensor. I can

389
00:27:53,610 --> 00:27:57,000
say that because in our roll
reveal that, yeah, Nick 60th

390
00:27:57,000 --> 00:27:59,790
anniversary brochure. So I'm
saying I'm saying it's has

391
00:27:59,790 --> 00:28:04,890
electro optical capabilities. So
around, the best way I can tell

392
00:28:04,890 --> 00:28:10,110
you without getting the trouble
is, look, look at those blocks.

393
00:28:10,170 --> 00:28:14,220
And so the earliest would have
been in the early 90s. But as

394
00:28:14,220 --> 00:28:19,950
these capabilities improved,
when I first heard about this

395
00:28:19,980 --> 00:28:24,240
phenomenon occurring, it was
more in the timeframe of when I

396
00:28:24,240 --> 00:28:29,700
became chief of Elan about
2003 2004. And the working group

397
00:28:30,510 --> 00:28:34,560
to that search, starting by
2004 2005. Gotcha.

398
00:28:35,670 --> 00:28:38,460
John Greenewald: So what's the
next step once a working group

399
00:28:38,460 --> 00:28:43,080
convenes? And I assume but I
want to clarify that the working

400
00:28:43,080 --> 00:28:48,090
group would be an eighth a
official CIA Working Group.

401
00:28:49,079 --> 00:28:52,079
John Ramirez: No, it wasn't, it
was an official nga working

402
00:28:52,079 --> 00:28:59,069
group. Okay. And GA was the
source of the data and whoever

403
00:28:59,069 --> 00:29:02,369
has the source of the data.
They're in charge of the working

404
00:29:02,369 --> 00:29:05,879
group. So it was NGA. I see.
Okay, National Geospatial

405
00:29:05,879 --> 00:29:09,569
Intelligence Agency. They
they're the ones who analyze,

406
00:29:10,409 --> 00:29:14,189
optical and electro optical
imagery. I see. So it was their

407
00:29:14,189 --> 00:29:19,169
data. And so our tasking at the
CIA side, we were weapons

408
00:29:19,169 --> 00:29:21,719
intelligence, Non Proliferation
arms control the weapons

409
00:29:21,719 --> 00:29:26,639
intelligence part. The first
thing we want to do is to rule

410
00:29:26,639 --> 00:29:34,679
out is it advanced technology
from an adversary. And since we

411
00:29:34,679 --> 00:29:39,419
look at advanced technology from
our adversaries, we can do that

412
00:29:39,419 --> 00:29:43,109
analysis. There are people
looking at the actual craft that

413
00:29:43,109 --> 00:29:48,689
could potentially be this and
we're looking at the sensors or

414
00:29:48,689 --> 00:29:53,459
packages like countermeasures,
electronic countermeasures, that

415
00:29:53,459 --> 00:29:58,559
could be providing this this
kind of or like, manifestation.

416
00:29:59,249 --> 00:30:05,669
And so What we looked at was US
platforms in the Russian

417
00:30:05,669 --> 00:30:10,769
inventory, that could have some
kind of capability like that.

418
00:30:11,189 --> 00:30:16,139
And plasma Stealth is that type
of capability. Whereas we built

419
00:30:16,139 --> 00:30:20,519
faceted, kind of shaped
aircraft, like the F 117

420
00:30:20,519 --> 00:30:27,149
Nighthawk. With facets and with
radar absorbing materials, the

421
00:30:27,149 --> 00:30:31,649
Russians went the opposite way
they built devices that can be

422
00:30:31,649 --> 00:30:36,419
hung on to some of their
aircraft and produce a plasma

423
00:30:36,419 --> 00:30:40,379
field. So okay, that's, that's
all comes razor. You know,

424
00:30:40,379 --> 00:30:44,819
that's the simplest explanation.
Uh huh. That's what it is. But

425
00:30:44,999 --> 00:30:48,299
these orbs started appearing
like way beyond the highest

426
00:30:48,299 --> 00:30:55,199
flying Russian aircraft, which
is the MC 31. It, it flew higher

427
00:30:55,199 --> 00:31:03,629
than the FOXHOUND. And so
123,000 feet is its maximum

428
00:31:03,659 --> 00:31:08,789
ceiling, it did, like briefly,
in a test, it usually flies

429
00:31:08,789 --> 00:31:14,609
between like 85 to 100,000, in
what we call wartime mode, they

430
00:31:14,609 --> 00:31:17,789
don't fly that all the time. But
if they need to, they can

431
00:31:17,789 --> 00:31:22,049
sustain some flight because it's
basically designed to shoot down

432
00:31:23,609 --> 00:31:30,539
a LSR 71. It would look down,
the radar is capable of looking

433
00:31:30,539 --> 00:31:33,629
down to missiles capable of
firing down, we call it look

434
00:31:33,629 --> 00:31:37,649
down, shoot down. It had that
capability for that purpose. And

435
00:31:37,649 --> 00:31:41,189
if you're wondering why we don't
fly SRR 70 ones anymore? Why do

436
00:31:41,189 --> 00:31:45,209
we take them off the inventory.
That's one of the reasons, as

437
00:31:45,209 --> 00:31:47,879
well as improvements in Soviet
Air Defense, Russian air

438
00:31:47,879 --> 00:31:53,279
defenses. So we rule that out
completely. And so other

439
00:31:53,279 --> 00:31:55,619
components of the intelligence
community will bring their

440
00:31:55,619 --> 00:32:00,269
expertise to rule out their
areas of expertise that they

441
00:32:00,269 --> 00:32:04,319
have knowledge of. And once that
happens, subject matter experts,

442
00:32:04,319 --> 00:32:10,049
and each intelligence agency
will be called together and meet

443
00:32:10,109 --> 00:32:15,029
to share information that they
have gathered to rule out

444
00:32:15,059 --> 00:32:19,859
everything. And then it was an
opportunity for Nga, and in our

445
00:32:19,859 --> 00:32:24,239
role, after they checked that it
wasn't a software glitch. And it

446
00:32:24,239 --> 00:32:27,539
wasn't a hardware glitch on the
satellite. They brought their

447
00:32:27,539 --> 00:32:33,599
expertise in. And at some point,
in that working group, they were

448
00:32:34,109 --> 00:32:39,179
informed about more of the
history of the intelligence

449
00:32:39,179 --> 00:32:44,939
community and US government's
dealings with you followed me at

450
00:32:44,939 --> 00:32:51,059
a very deep, classified level, I
refuse to be briefed into that.

451
00:32:51,419 --> 00:32:54,989
I didn't want to be briefed into
that at all. I didn't need

452
00:32:55,169 --> 00:32:59,849
actually to know that. But I
didn't need for them to share

453
00:33:00,059 --> 00:33:02,399
why they wanted to have my
engineers to go to this working

454
00:33:02,399 --> 00:33:06,779
group. And so my job was to
write performance appraisal

455
00:33:06,779 --> 00:33:08,879
reports, I just need to know
what they're doing. So I can

456
00:33:08,879 --> 00:33:11,789
evaluate what they're doing, and
account for their time and pay

457
00:33:11,789 --> 00:33:12,629
for their trips.

458
00:33:14,010 --> 00:33:16,500
John Greenewald: So I've got
like 12,000 questions is popped

459
00:33:16,500 --> 00:33:19,710
in here in the last 90 seconds
of what you were saying. So let

460
00:33:19,710 --> 00:33:23,220
me first start with the
involvement with the field of

461
00:33:23,310 --> 00:33:28,050
ufology. Is there any type of
elaboration you can offer on

462
00:33:28,050 --> 00:33:30,000
that? I know, you said you
weren't briefed. So I got that.

463
00:33:30,300 --> 00:33:33,090
But I mean, do you know what
they were referring to? Are you

464
00:33:33,090 --> 00:33:37,170
talking about just They're,
they're, in my opinion, not

465
00:33:37,170 --> 00:33:41,190
really an investigative effort,
but in essence, trying to skew

466
00:33:41,190 --> 00:33:44,460
the storyline during the project
Bluebook era? Are you are you

467
00:33:44,460 --> 00:33:47,850
talking about that or something
post Bluebook and something more

468
00:33:47,850 --> 00:33:48,510
sinister,

469
00:33:49,230 --> 00:33:51,360
John Ramirez: nothing sinister.
But we're talking about the

470
00:33:51,360 --> 00:34:02,580
actual technical exploitation of
the UFO craft that flew during

471
00:34:02,580 --> 00:34:08,910
the classic era 50 6070s During
that project Bluebook time the

472
00:34:08,910 --> 00:34:12,300
data that was collected that by
the government, that's what

473
00:34:12,300 --> 00:34:15,270
we're talking about, and they go
okay, I believe they got briefed

474
00:34:15,270 --> 00:34:16,050
into that

475
00:34:16,830 --> 00:34:20,670
John Greenewald: data or
physical objects slash crash

476
00:34:20,670 --> 00:34:23,580
John Ramirez: as far as I know,
data. I don't know if they saw

477
00:34:23,970 --> 00:34:27,300
physical objects. I don't know
if they saw anything about crash

478
00:34:27,300 --> 00:34:30,720
retrievals metamaterials, I
don't know because I didn't have

479
00:34:30,720 --> 00:34:32,250
access to that kind of Meishan.

480
00:34:33,030 --> 00:34:35,220
John Greenewald: Really quickly,
why did you turn it down with

481
00:34:35,220 --> 00:34:39,000
your, with your background and
personal interest? Was there a

482
00:34:39,000 --> 00:34:40,590
reason that you don't mind
sharing?

483
00:34:41,250 --> 00:34:45,450
John Ramirez: Well, basically,
you know, this wasn't my day

484
00:34:45,450 --> 00:34:48,990
job. My day job was much more
involved than just sending two

485
00:34:48,990 --> 00:34:54,210
engineers to this. And the thing
about CIA is that we don't hire

486
00:34:54,210 --> 00:34:58,560
people with curiosity. You know,
I mean, if you're going to get a

487
00:34:58,560 --> 00:35:01,020
job at CIA because you're
curious about UFOs, you want to

488
00:35:01,020 --> 00:35:03,210
get a job there? You're not
going to get a job there. Yeah,

489
00:35:03,240 --> 00:35:07,410
we have just cific missions to
do we have specific jobs to

490
00:35:07,410 --> 00:35:12,480
accomplish. And so that was my
focus. And my plate was full

491
00:35:12,480 --> 00:35:16,830
with many, many other things,
not to mention a budget. Gotcha.

492
00:35:16,860 --> 00:35:21,330
So, you know, my life was like,
too much sheets. Gotcha. Excel

493
00:35:21,330 --> 00:35:25,410
spreadsheets was the was my job
as a branch chief. That's all I

494
00:35:25,410 --> 00:35:29,850
looked at, it seems like, and
managing programs and leading

495
00:35:29,850 --> 00:35:35,880
people. The Career Service of
these people was my

496
00:35:35,880 --> 00:35:40,080
responsibility, that I make sure
that they're challenged, that

497
00:35:40,110 --> 00:35:44,640
they're trained, that they're
accomplishing the mission that

498
00:35:44,640 --> 00:35:50,400
we need to accomplish. That was
my focus. So just this is just

499
00:35:50,400 --> 00:35:55,320
being like an interest of mine.
I knew what I needed to know, to

500
00:35:55,320 --> 00:35:59,190
do my job. And that's all I
needed to know. Gotcha. But I

501
00:35:59,190 --> 00:36:02,310
would say this, when they came
back, my two engineers came

502
00:36:02,310 --> 00:36:07,560
back. I used to have a little
alien doll, a gray, except it

503
00:36:07,560 --> 00:36:12,420
was colored green. And it was
like a stuffed stuffed all that

504
00:36:12,420 --> 00:36:17,070
I could bend and put it on my
old 17 inch Dale CRT monitor.

505
00:36:17,100 --> 00:36:21,420
Yeah, yeah, top of the line at
the top of the line, and that

506
00:36:21,480 --> 00:36:25,890
everyone knew I was interested
in it. And UFOs and ETs, right.

507
00:36:26,370 --> 00:36:29,520
And so when they came back, they
didn't say anything they sounded

508
00:36:29,520 --> 00:36:35,580
like not to my doll. And the
basic set, you know, everything

509
00:36:35,580 --> 00:36:43,320
you think about. That all makes
sense now. Wow. So okay, I don't

510
00:36:43,320 --> 00:36:46,020
need to know more. Yeah, they
didn't tell me anymore. So

511
00:36:46,020 --> 00:36:49,860
that's the closest I got to
knowing what they what they

512
00:36:49,860 --> 00:36:50,760
knew. But

513
00:36:51,480 --> 00:36:54,270
John Greenewald: so let me with
with that being said, if that

514
00:36:54,270 --> 00:36:56,760
was the closest you got, let me
take you back to the working

515
00:36:56,760 --> 00:36:59,970
group. And it sounds like you
guys worked really hard on

516
00:36:59,970 --> 00:37:03,540
trying to figure out, you know,
is there a Soviet explanation

517
00:37:03,540 --> 00:37:06,840
for this, and essentially ruled
a lot of that out? Are all of

518
00:37:06,840 --> 00:37:09,750
that out? Was there a
conclusion? I mean, what were

519
00:37:09,750 --> 00:37:12,600
you guys leaning towards at that
point, when the intelligence and

520
00:37:12,600 --> 00:37:16,320
the data showed you? It was not
the Soviets? It was not this MIG

521
00:37:16,320 --> 00:37:19,440
it was not? Whatever you were
looking at? What was the

522
00:37:19,440 --> 00:37:20,220
working?

523
00:37:21,090 --> 00:37:24,000
John Ramirez: Theory? Yeah, I
would preface that with it was

524
00:37:24,030 --> 00:37:29,340
during the Russian era, because
in the early 90s, the Soviet

525
00:37:29,340 --> 00:37:30,270
Union have,

526
00:37:30,780 --> 00:37:31,650
John Greenewald: gotcha, sorry,

527
00:37:31,680 --> 00:37:34,770
John Ramirez: I was rushing back
a little too far. Um, but I

528
00:37:34,770 --> 00:37:35,400
wasn't privy

529
00:37:35,400 --> 00:37:36,720
John Greenewald: to Tech was
probably the same. It's

530
00:37:36,720 --> 00:37:39,420
John Ramirez: fine. Yeah, I
wasn't privy to any of the

531
00:37:39,420 --> 00:37:43,800
results of what the working
group did. I did not know, I

532
00:37:43,800 --> 00:37:47,130
just know, there was a working
group, it dealt with this

533
00:37:47,130 --> 00:37:54,120
unusual orb anomaly. I knew that
it was in the 600 nanometre

534
00:37:54,120 --> 00:37:57,600
range, which is orange, which
kind of fits what people see

535
00:37:57,780 --> 00:38:04,710
themselves now, I witnesses,
orange orbs, that they were not

536
00:38:04,710 --> 00:38:10,440
just random specks. But they
were flying in some kind of

537
00:38:10,440 --> 00:38:14,280
grouping. I say formation, but
when I say formation, people

538
00:38:14,280 --> 00:38:17,460
think of a you know V shape or
something like that. It was just

539
00:38:17,460 --> 00:38:25,590
flying together. Okay. At a very
fast rate coming over the the

540
00:38:25,620 --> 00:38:31,680
Arctic Circle region, over the
Russian landmass with intent to

541
00:38:31,680 --> 00:38:34,530
go somewhere, you know, it's not
like there's a scattering

542
00:38:34,530 --> 00:38:39,240
everywhere. There's a whole
group flying together as a

543
00:38:39,240 --> 00:38:41,070
group. And so that's, that's
what I knew.

544
00:38:41,280 --> 00:38:43,830
John Greenewald: So you. Okay,
so you found out about all of

545
00:38:43,830 --> 00:38:47,550
that, but you but never know,
whomever shared with you this

546
00:38:47,550 --> 00:38:53,610
information? Never said, John,
this is what we think it is, or

547
00:38:53,640 --> 00:38:55,140
no, no, no,

548
00:38:55,170 --> 00:38:57,660
John Ramirez: that was a
compartment, they were read into

549
00:38:57,660 --> 00:39:00,390
a compartment that was created
for that purpose for the working

550
00:39:00,390 --> 00:39:01,110
group purpose,

551
00:39:01,350 --> 00:39:04,410
John Greenewald: from what you
did learn and your experience,

552
00:39:04,590 --> 00:39:09,420
extensive experience with all of
this through 25 years. Looking

553
00:39:09,420 --> 00:39:13,050
back, what do you feel and I
know it's an opinion and you're

554
00:39:13,050 --> 00:39:16,260
not sharing classified info
here. But if I were to just ask

555
00:39:16,260 --> 00:39:19,950
you based on your personal
opinion and your intelligence on

556
00:39:19,950 --> 00:39:21,540
the matter, what would you say?

557
00:39:22,290 --> 00:39:25,320
John Ramirez: Well, I, I believe
that these orbs are some

558
00:39:25,320 --> 00:39:29,610
manifestations of the phenomenon
that is not metallic craft, it

559
00:39:29,610 --> 00:39:38,760
could be okay, so for with my
interest in more of the esoteric

560
00:39:41,310 --> 00:39:45,810
features, if you follow g that
is more like what we call the

561
00:39:45,810 --> 00:39:49,560
metaphysical side of your
apology. I believe that they're

562
00:39:49,590 --> 00:39:55,140
like, manifestations of higher
consciousness, that they're not

563
00:39:55,140 --> 00:40:00,930
like craft. They're not like,
like Tic Tac or Kimble are go

564
00:40:00,930 --> 00:40:05,730
fast. But they're like
manifestations of some other fun

565
00:40:05,760 --> 00:40:09,870
parts of the phenomenon that we
don't quite fully understand.

566
00:40:10,620 --> 00:40:13,470
But when you talk to
experiencers, they fully

567
00:40:13,470 --> 00:40:16,440
understand it. If you talk to
people who have seen these orbs,

568
00:40:17,520 --> 00:40:19,800
they fully understand what
they're looking at that there's

569
00:40:19,800 --> 00:40:25,020
some consciousness behind what
they're seeing. To the point,

570
00:40:25,020 --> 00:40:31,740
when I saw my orb in 2020, I got
a message from it, to do what

571
00:40:31,740 --> 00:40:34,380
I'm doing right now that you
have information The world needs

572
00:40:34,380 --> 00:40:38,730
to know. You need to share this
information. You need to work

573
00:40:38,730 --> 00:40:43,560
with someone who's looking to,
to have answers to their

574
00:40:43,560 --> 00:40:47,460
questions, and I found that
person. So that's my

575
00:40:47,460 --> 00:40:49,050
interpretation. Who

576
00:40:49,170 --> 00:40:51,630
John Greenewald: can ask who is
that? No, I can't I can't help

577
00:40:51,630 --> 00:40:54,420
you. Under understood, I wasn't
sure if there was a maybe a

578
00:40:54,420 --> 00:40:58,350
public program project that you
were doing that you can No, but

579
00:40:58,350 --> 00:41:01,230
no problem is private. Sorry.
Yeah. I didn't mean to I didn't

580
00:41:01,230 --> 00:41:06,090
mean to pry too much there. But
so so your experience, obviously

581
00:41:06,090 --> 00:41:11,940
was kind of reminiscent to what
the k 11 And the NGA data that

582
00:41:11,940 --> 00:41:14,850
was being shared with the CIA
and that working group? Do you

583
00:41:14,850 --> 00:41:17,550
feel it was the same phenomena
phenomenon?

584
00:41:17,760 --> 00:41:21,720
John Ramirez: Well, the orb
phenomenon was more of the

585
00:41:21,720 --> 00:41:28,560
electro optical variety IR
previously, that the Soviet

586
00:41:28,560 --> 00:41:33,930
Union, during the Soviet era,
with their radar systems did

587
00:41:33,930 --> 00:41:41,790
detect unusual events in the
sky. And we call those the domes

588
00:41:41,790 --> 00:41:47,430
of light. So that's another type
of a light kind of manifestation

589
00:41:47,430 --> 00:41:52,740
of the phenomenon. And I first
heard about the domes like not

590
00:41:52,740 --> 00:41:57,120
through any kind of intelligence
source, but a quasi intelligence

591
00:41:57,120 --> 00:42:00,300
source, the Aviation Week
journal, which we used to call

592
00:42:00,300 --> 00:42:04,650
aviation leak yet, because
there's so much good information

593
00:42:04,650 --> 00:42:09,210
in there that we actually
circulated around the office for

594
00:42:09,240 --> 00:42:13,440
and we put a routing slip on it
to make sure we check our names

595
00:42:13,440 --> 00:42:16,290
off because there was so much
information there, that actually

596
00:42:16,290 --> 00:42:21,240
triggered a lot of professional
investigations into what they

597
00:42:21,240 --> 00:42:24,720
were reporting. And one of them
was the domes of light, which

598
00:42:24,750 --> 00:42:31,980
FTD knew about. And then they,
the FTD wanted to cast this as a

599
00:42:31,980 --> 00:42:37,650
type of Soviet ballistic missile
countermeasures that they were

600
00:42:37,650 --> 00:42:43,920
seeing. But these domes of light
occurred absent of any missile

601
00:42:43,920 --> 00:42:49,530
test. And the missile that was
most prevalent with these drones

602
00:42:49,530 --> 00:42:56,370
alive was the SS 20 Sable, which
was an intercontinental no

603
00:42:56,370 --> 00:43:00,600
intermediate range ballistic
missile IRBM, which was

604
00:43:00,600 --> 00:43:04,620
politically destabilizing and
militarily destabilizing during

605
00:43:04,620 --> 00:43:10,170
the day because they would like
station DS, SS 20s, close to

606
00:43:10,200 --> 00:43:14,880
NATO. And that was its purpose.
The target was NATO. And that

607
00:43:14,880 --> 00:43:20,700
prompted us to then deploy the
Pershing to IRBM. So you have

608
00:43:20,730 --> 00:43:24,750
nuclear missiles that can land
on targets within minutes,

609
00:43:24,780 --> 00:43:27,960
because they're so close. And
that was highly politically

610
00:43:27,990 --> 00:43:32,850
destabilizing. And so the
phenomenon probably my opinion

611
00:43:32,850 --> 00:43:36,600
is the phenomenon knowing that
we know now that that they're

612
00:43:36,600 --> 00:43:40,110
associated with like ballistic
missiles, nuclear type ballistic

613
00:43:40,110 --> 00:43:43,170
missiles, phenomenon had an
interest in the testing of the

614
00:43:43,170 --> 00:43:47,070
SS 20. And so when they launch
SS 20, this phenomenon will

615
00:43:47,070 --> 00:43:51,960
occur, which was interpreted by
FTD in the most mundane way.

616
00:43:52,140 --> 00:43:54,300
It's just ballistic missile
countermeasures. But how do you

617
00:43:54,480 --> 00:43:59,700
describe this phenomenon being
seen by people on the ground,

618
00:43:59,940 --> 00:44:02,850
we're not associated with a
Soviet military. There's just

619
00:44:02,850 --> 00:44:07,080
eyewitnesses, citizens on the
ground seeing this. So it's not

620
00:44:07,080 --> 00:44:11,760
like totally related to
ballistic missile testing. And

621
00:44:11,760 --> 00:44:16,890
that was detected by radars by
the Russian radar, the Soviet

622
00:44:16,890 --> 00:44:22,590
radars at the time. So in that
sense, my very first encounter

623
00:44:22,590 --> 00:44:25,860
with anything of high
strangeness was not these this

624
00:44:25,890 --> 00:44:29,700
or working group, but this
phenomenon known as the domes of

625
00:44:29,700 --> 00:44:35,340
light, where we actually
deployed sensors to look for

626
00:44:35,370 --> 00:44:41,250
these unusual types of anomalous
lights. And where we deployed

627
00:44:41,250 --> 00:44:47,070
that sensor was on the periphery
of the Soviet Union. Because we

628
00:44:47,070 --> 00:44:51,510
wanted to get a good look at as
the missiles were flying their

629
00:44:51,510 --> 00:44:56,280
trajectories, and re entering
the warheads were reenter. We

630
00:44:56,280 --> 00:44:59,370
want to be able to detect if
there any of these stones are

631
00:44:59,370 --> 00:44:59,760
like

632
00:45:01,260 --> 00:45:03,150
John Greenewald: Let me ask you
a hypothetical question. And

633
00:45:03,150 --> 00:45:08,490
this is more towards the orb
working group versus the domes

634
00:45:08,490 --> 00:45:11,850
of light. But let's, let's say
and I know you don't know the

635
00:45:11,850 --> 00:45:14,940
conclusion, but that but they
were leading to some kind of

636
00:45:14,940 --> 00:45:20,550
manifestation of a phenomenon of
some kind. That was not related

637
00:45:20,550 --> 00:45:22,680
to a missile launcher
countermeasures or anything like

638
00:45:22,680 --> 00:45:26,670
that. Is that something that
either the NGA would take the

639
00:45:26,670 --> 00:45:31,440
next step and trying to figure
out, or in my opinion, for many,

640
00:45:31,440 --> 00:45:35,160
many years, and arguably
decades, some of these

641
00:45:35,160 --> 00:45:38,220
intelligence agencies just kind
of turned a blind eye to the

642
00:45:38,520 --> 00:45:43,080
more nuts and bolts UFO
phenomenon. With this, do you

643
00:45:43,080 --> 00:45:45,690
think the CIA would have said,
Hey, we need to figure this out,

644
00:45:45,690 --> 00:45:49,200
we as the CIA, or with the NGA
do that? Or do you think that

645
00:45:49,200 --> 00:45:53,490
they would just say, You know
what, we're gonna leave this

646
00:45:53,580 --> 00:45:56,850
well enough alone, like, Who do
you think would be taking the

647
00:45:56,850 --> 00:45:59,910
lead on trying to then take the
next step to understand it?

648
00:46:00,270 --> 00:46:02,490
John Ramirez: Well, so working
group, the product of the

649
00:46:02,490 --> 00:46:08,070
working group will be a report
of their best estimate,

650
00:46:08,340 --> 00:46:13,800
assessment or judgment of what
we detected. And that report

651
00:46:13,800 --> 00:46:19,050
will go to the Director of
National Intelligence. And the

652
00:46:19,050 --> 00:46:21,540
director of national
intelligence can then brief the

653
00:46:21,540 --> 00:46:27,750
policymaker. That is the
president united states and the

654
00:46:29,340 --> 00:46:35,010
appointed policymakers like the
Secretary of Defense. And once

655
00:46:35,010 --> 00:46:39,240
that report is written, the
title 50 side and for your

656
00:46:39,240 --> 00:46:44,430
audience, the title 50 is the
non DoD side of the intelligence

657
00:46:44,430 --> 00:46:48,750
community. So it's basically
CIA, and actually parts of the

658
00:46:48,750 --> 00:46:58,890
NSA, which are non military.
That they would then just

659
00:46:59,370 --> 00:47:02,670
produce the working group
produce the report from a title

660
00:47:02,670 --> 00:47:06,360
50 perspective of the civilian
side of all of these

661
00:47:06,360 --> 00:47:10,440
intelligence agencies. And
there's the report. Now, the

662
00:47:10,440 --> 00:47:14,220
Secretary of Defense, being
briefed on this, maybe Usdi

663
00:47:14,610 --> 00:47:18,960
being briefed on this. It's up
to them to decide you know what

664
00:47:18,960 --> 00:47:24,540
to do. And they may then take
the DoD perspective on just

665
00:47:24,540 --> 00:47:28,050
about everything like that it's
a threat, or could it be a

666
00:47:28,050 --> 00:47:32,100
threat? And if it is a threat,
or could be a threat? First of

667
00:47:32,100 --> 00:47:37,200
all, how do we protect our own
forces? What is the nature of

668
00:47:37,200 --> 00:47:40,110
this threat? What are
vulnerabilities versus this

669
00:47:40,110 --> 00:47:43,800
threat? And how do we do force
protection? So that's their

670
00:47:43,800 --> 00:47:51,420
focus, and incomes all set? So
2004 2005, when I left for NCPC,

671
00:47:51,450 --> 00:47:56,130
and return to 2009, that working
group was done. My understanding

672
00:47:56,130 --> 00:48:00,330
was it was done like 2007, there
abouts. It was a short lived

673
00:48:00,330 --> 00:48:03,690
working group. It wasn't like
something that lasted years and

674
00:48:03,690 --> 00:48:05,280
years and years. Are you

675
00:48:05,280 --> 00:48:09,840
John Greenewald: aware of that
report? That they potentially I

676
00:48:09,840 --> 00:48:11,940
know that that's a standard
procedure that you're going

677
00:48:11,940 --> 00:48:15,210
over? But in direct relation to
that or working group? Are you

678
00:48:15,210 --> 00:48:17,040
familiar that they created a
report?

679
00:48:17,670 --> 00:48:20,880
John Ramirez: I can say that a
report was a product of the

680
00:48:20,880 --> 00:48:25,770
working group? So the Rams so
they there was a report? I don't

681
00:48:25,770 --> 00:48:26,550
say that. So

682
00:48:26,550 --> 00:48:29,160
John Greenewald: classified? Is
this a classified? Absolutely.

683
00:48:29,160 --> 00:48:29,250
It's

684
00:48:29,250 --> 00:48:31,350
John Ramirez: going to be
classified? Because in that

685
00:48:31,350 --> 00:48:35,070
report that we use sources, the
methods, they were used exactly

686
00:48:35,550 --> 00:48:37,860
what the sensors were able to
detect

687
00:48:38,250 --> 00:48:39,930
John Greenewald: classified
elements. I'm talking about the

688
00:48:39,930 --> 00:48:42,930
project or program or excuse me,
working group, I want to make

689
00:48:42,930 --> 00:48:45,150
sure I'm accurate here. But the
working group as a whole, was it

690
00:48:45,150 --> 00:48:47,940
a classified effort as a whole?
Absolutely. It

691
00:48:47,940 --> 00:48:51,900
John Ramirez: was a top secret
SCI working group with a

692
00:48:51,930 --> 00:48:54,120
compartment designed for that
working group.

693
00:48:55,200 --> 00:48:58,500
John Greenewald: And all that
makes sense. Can I ask just as

694
00:48:58,500 --> 00:49:02,100
myself being a layman? And not
entirely sure about all of every

695
00:49:02,100 --> 00:49:06,810
facet of the classified world?
How is it that you're able to

696
00:49:06,840 --> 00:49:10,440
talk about I know, you didn't
give conclusions, and you didn't

697
00:49:10,440 --> 00:49:12,750
talk about technical
capabilities of you know, top

698
00:49:12,750 --> 00:49:16,620
secret tech. But if the idea of
the if the working group itself

699
00:49:16,620 --> 00:49:22,200
was a top secret sci fi
environment helped me understand

700
00:49:22,200 --> 00:49:23,280
how can we talk about it?

701
00:49:23,580 --> 00:49:26,820
John Ramirez: Well, John, their
their levels of understanding

702
00:49:27,330 --> 00:49:31,710
and the first level of
understanding is called fact of

703
00:49:32,490 --> 00:49:38,790
fact of that something occurred.
So the fact of is not sensitive.

704
00:49:39,090 --> 00:49:43,980
Now, I mean, I learned of this
way back when, and I sat on it

705
00:49:44,010 --> 00:49:50,280
until, like, this year. You
know, when I started doing these

706
00:49:50,280 --> 00:49:54,510
podcasts, and I put it together
in a report for CIA's review,

707
00:49:55,500 --> 00:49:59,040
that you know, working group
happened and this is what might

708
00:49:59,040 --> 00:50:04,680
have happened And I couched it
in terms that could be a

709
00:50:04,680 --> 00:50:07,770
hypothetical, but CIA knew that
this working group occurred.

710
00:50:08,339 --> 00:50:11,609
John Greenewald: And they just
to clarify, because I've talked

711
00:50:11,609 --> 00:50:14,399
about the DoD side on this
channel before, so my audience

712
00:50:14,399 --> 00:50:16,919
has seen a lot of the videos,
that would be the Doppler

713
00:50:16,919 --> 00:50:20,909
process, the DD Form 1910, so on
and so forth, that ties into the

714
00:50:21,389 --> 00:50:25,619
UAP videos. So CIA, I assume,
would just have the same similar

715
00:50:25,619 --> 00:50:30,599
process where you take what you
are going to either publish talk

716
00:50:30,599 --> 00:50:36,809
about verbally orally in a in a,
like a conference or lecture,

717
00:50:36,869 --> 00:50:40,319
and they approve what you can
come out with is that that's

718
00:50:40,319 --> 00:50:43,529
correct. Okay. So and they gave
you approval to talk about this,

719
00:50:43,560 --> 00:50:46,290
John Ramirez: right, the pre
publication classification

720
00:50:46,290 --> 00:50:51,810
review board, stated that my
presentation was unclassified

721
00:50:51,840 --> 00:50:59,010
and can be publicly disseminated
everything in it. And that they

722
00:50:59,010 --> 00:51:03,150
do not that the fact that they
consider it unclassified, they

723
00:51:03,150 --> 00:51:08,430
do not say that they can endorse
sure everything in it, whether

724
00:51:08,430 --> 00:51:13,290
it be factual, or not factual.
So it's there, they're out the

725
00:51:13,290 --> 00:51:17,880
way the way they can like
distance itself themselves. From

726
00:51:17,910 --> 00:51:21,840
anything we CIA officers might
produce, even if it's factual,

727
00:51:22,530 --> 00:51:26,160
they will always say, well, we
can't stay say officially, that

728
00:51:26,160 --> 00:51:30,690
is factual. So that was the
situation that I follow. This is

729
00:51:30,690 --> 00:51:34,080
the front door situation, I just
want to let everyone know, I am

730
00:51:34,080 --> 00:51:38,130
not a whistleblower. I went
through the front door, and I

731
00:51:38,130 --> 00:51:40,800
will always go to the front
door, because that's what I

732
00:51:40,800 --> 00:51:45,570
signed up to do when I left CIA
to protect sources and methods

733
00:51:45,600 --> 00:51:50,070
over a lifetime. And then, so
that was the process I followed,

734
00:51:50,070 --> 00:51:54,480
which allows me to be speaking
with you. And I let CIA know

735
00:51:54,480 --> 00:51:57,690
that if there's anything I say,
and, you know, they're

736
00:51:57,690 --> 00:52:00,960
monitoring all of my
appearances, they monitor Jim,

737
00:52:00,960 --> 00:52:04,650
semi events, appearances on
Coast coasts, or any any

738
00:52:04,680 --> 00:52:07,710
appearances by former
intelligence community officers

739
00:52:08,010 --> 00:52:11,580
are home offices, believe me,
they're monitoring what you say.

740
00:52:11,970 --> 00:52:15,270
And they know it, because I told
them if there's anything I do,

741
00:52:15,480 --> 00:52:22,470
or say, that crosses a line, let
me know. And I will stop. And so

742
00:52:22,470 --> 00:52:27,180
far, I've received no feedback
about stop.

743
00:52:29,130 --> 00:52:31,740
John Greenewald: If you could
sum up what your intention is by

744
00:52:31,740 --> 00:52:35,100
doing these types of shows and
bringing this information

745
00:52:35,100 --> 00:52:38,580
forward. In summary, what are
you wanting to accomplish?

746
00:52:39,660 --> 00:52:42,330
John Ramirez: I want to
accomplish that what we all

747
00:52:42,330 --> 00:52:46,620
know, as you follow just what
you know, it is that the

748
00:52:46,620 --> 00:52:51,780
government, even project
Bluebook was a limited program

749
00:52:51,960 --> 00:52:58,080
of gathering information from
citizens gathering information

750
00:52:58,080 --> 00:53:02,550
from citizens maybe to debunk or
maybe to collect these other

751
00:53:02,550 --> 00:53:08,010
incidents in their database. But
there was an ongoing process

752
00:53:08,280 --> 00:53:14,010
since Roswell, to try to
understand what we're seeing

753
00:53:14,340 --> 00:53:19,320
what we have collected, that
process never stopped. And this

754
00:53:19,320 --> 00:53:24,810
orb working group was just a
latest part of that long,

755
00:53:24,840 --> 00:53:30,390
ongoing process to where we're
not seeing metallic craft. Now

756
00:53:30,420 --> 00:53:34,830
we're seeing these entities of
light appearing over the earth.

757
00:53:36,450 --> 00:53:42,000
And so I want people know that
what your knowing what you known

758
00:53:42,000 --> 00:53:48,480
as all SAP and Atef. That wasn't
when it started. We informed I

759
00:53:48,480 --> 00:53:52,080
believe we informed the people
who did all sap in ative, they

760
00:53:52,080 --> 00:53:56,280
must have known about this
working group, because they were

761
00:53:56,310 --> 00:53:59,880
there were Defense Intelligence
people associated with that

762
00:53:59,880 --> 00:54:02,340
working group. Looking at orbs,

763
00:54:02,699 --> 00:54:05,849
John Greenewald: so it and
that's an interesting line

764
00:54:05,879 --> 00:54:09,089
chronologically, you're talking
about it sounds like a few years

765
00:54:09,089 --> 00:54:12,659
roughly, you know the the
concept of SAP depending upon

766
00:54:12,659 --> 00:54:16,559
who you believe, was kind of
born in 2007. Officially, it was

767
00:54:16,589 --> 00:54:20,339
you know, towards the end of
2008 when it was contracted out.

768
00:54:20,579 --> 00:54:24,719
So you feel that that's there's
a direct line there between or

769
00:54:24,719 --> 00:54:28,169
maybe not direct, but there's a
line or connection between the

770
00:54:28,169 --> 00:54:32,039
work of a or working group like
this, the discovery of that

771
00:54:32,549 --> 00:54:38,849
phenomenon, and then the OSS AP
contract coming up and the DIA

772
00:54:38,849 --> 00:54:41,729
is focus, you feel that there's
some kind of line there.

773
00:54:41,760 --> 00:54:44,670
John Ramirez: There's a lineage,
there's a lineage, it's not a

774
00:54:44,670 --> 00:54:49,500
direct lineage, but when title
50 got done, title 10 took it

775
00:54:49,500 --> 00:54:53,790
up. Title 10 being the
Department of Defense, and so

776
00:54:53,820 --> 00:54:58,140
many of the same people who are
in the DIA and under Title 50

777
00:54:58,800 --> 00:55:05,160
under NSA In a row, they're also
kind of under mostly under title

778
00:55:05,190 --> 00:55:10,560
title 10. They answer to the
Secretary of Defense. They nod

779
00:55:10,620 --> 00:55:15,480
to the DNI. We answered the DNI
were title 50. And people need

780
00:55:15,480 --> 00:55:18,450
to realize that the Intelligence
Committee isn't this big

781
00:55:18,450 --> 00:55:26,010
monolith. There are different US
Code laws that met that regulate

782
00:55:26,010 --> 00:55:29,610
what we can do. We have to
follow these laws. We follow

783
00:55:29,610 --> 00:55:34,590
title 50, DOD falls, title 10.
And so Lew said this himself,

784
00:55:34,590 --> 00:55:38,880
this was a title 10 effort. He
always mentions this is a title

785
00:55:38,880 --> 00:55:44,010
10 effort, because he knows that
there was a title 50 effort. And

786
00:55:44,010 --> 00:55:47,730
so he just doesn't say, We're
just DOD, the department is

787
00:55:47,730 --> 00:55:54,060
this. He says, this is a title
10 investigation into what we

788
00:55:54,060 --> 00:55:59,340
saw, and they went into even
more high strangeness with SIM

789
00:55:59,340 --> 00:55:59,790
Walker.

790
00:55:59,940 --> 00:56:02,310
John Greenewald: Exactly. And
that that leads me to my next

791
00:56:02,310 --> 00:56:05,160
question, because I've always
been skeptical over what the

792
00:56:05,160 --> 00:56:12,870
official dia desire for OS app
was versus what contractor may

793
00:56:12,900 --> 00:56:18,000
have turned it into, or was he
just he meaning Bigelow, Robert

794
00:56:18,000 --> 00:56:20,730
Bigelow, but through Bigelow
Aerospace, when he was awarded

795
00:56:20,730 --> 00:56:25,290
this doing exactly what the DIA
wanted, or was it skewed a bit

796
00:56:25,320 --> 00:56:29,280
and ended up backfiring, hence
why it was defunded, a couple

797
00:56:29,280 --> 00:56:32,070
years later. I've always
struggled with that, because

798
00:56:32,190 --> 00:56:37,350
dia, as you mentioned, is the
military side of this, they're

799
00:56:37,590 --> 00:56:42,660
getting into, according to the
story, the paranormal and

800
00:56:42,660 --> 00:56:46,710
looking at Skinwalker Ranch and
orbs go along with a long list

801
00:56:46,710 --> 00:56:50,310
of other stuff, including, you
know, weird creatures that they

802
00:56:50,310 --> 00:56:54,630
were investigating and so on.
That also was in skinwalkers, in

803
00:56:54,630 --> 00:56:57,690
the Pentagon, and this is where
my skepticism comes out. So

804
00:56:57,690 --> 00:57:03,180
maybe you can help me out here
understand, why would that be in

805
00:57:03,180 --> 00:57:07,620
the purview of the DIA, I can
see a couple other agencies, if

806
00:57:07,620 --> 00:57:10,290
you took the DIA out and put,
you know, a couple other

807
00:57:10,290 --> 00:57:14,040
different agencies in okay, then
we could we can chat about that.

808
00:57:14,340 --> 00:57:18,990
But I don't see dia So from your
experience and expertise from

809
00:57:18,990 --> 00:57:21,420
the IC side. Why dia?

810
00:57:22,290 --> 00:57:26,910
John Ramirez: Why DIA is because
the director of DIA is the

811
00:57:26,910 --> 00:57:30,330
functional Mission Manager for
an intelligence defense

812
00:57:30,570 --> 00:57:34,620
discipline known as Masson
measurement and signature

813
00:57:34,650 --> 00:57:38,760
intelligence. Sometimes people
say signals intelligence, that's

814
00:57:38,760 --> 00:57:42,570
not correct. It's meant a
measurement and signature

815
00:57:42,600 --> 00:57:47,250
intelligence. So they would
deploy sensors that can collect

816
00:57:48,990 --> 00:57:53,760
this type this type of
phenomenon. They would collect

817
00:57:54,060 --> 00:57:59,910
radio metric data, radiological
data, infrared data, ultraviolet

818
00:57:59,910 --> 00:58:03,750
data, they will look at this
phenomenon with the sensor

819
00:58:03,750 --> 00:58:07,260
capabilities that they can
deploy. That doesn't just

820
00:58:07,260 --> 00:58:14,670
collect signals like NSA, or in
CIA, there's really no human

821
00:58:14,970 --> 00:58:19,830
involved because there's no one
to recruit as an as an agent to

822
00:58:19,830 --> 00:58:22,860
work for us. We're not going to
recruit the phenomenon, hey, why

823
00:58:22,860 --> 00:58:25,860
don't you work for us and tell
us what you're doing so this

824
00:58:25,860 --> 00:58:28,380
that those parts of the
intelligence community would not

825
00:58:28,380 --> 00:58:34,950
come into play. But that DIA is
responsible for Masset. There is

826
00:58:34,980 --> 00:58:40,710
a part of the DIA called Dia
slash Delta Tango dt, and that

827
00:58:40,710 --> 00:58:44,850
is the mass and office at DIA.
And so they have there's

828
00:58:44,850 --> 00:58:48,750
complete responsibility for
Masset. And since this

829
00:58:48,780 --> 00:58:54,840
phenomenon, is something that
requires collection, beyond our

830
00:58:55,800 --> 00:59:03,960
senses, beyond our other types
of capabilities and signals, our

831
00:59:03,960 --> 00:59:07,740
human or open source, dia will
come into play and that's why

832
00:59:07,740 --> 00:59:08,400
they're there.

833
00:59:09,719 --> 00:59:10,919
John Greenewald: But on US soil,

834
00:59:10,949 --> 00:59:13,649
John Ramirez: they do that
because Department of Defense.

835
00:59:14,699 --> 00:59:18,059
They're responsible for the
national security of the United

836
00:59:18,059 --> 00:59:25,499
States of America, in that very
tangible form. So dia, as

837
00:59:25,529 --> 00:59:33,149
Department of Defense title 10
can operate on US soil for the

838
00:59:33,149 --> 00:59:37,529
intelligence mission, they can
deploy. In that sense, CIA

839
00:59:37,529 --> 00:59:43,649
cannot deploy to collect
intelligence on US soil. Now, if

840
00:59:43,649 --> 00:59:47,669
this phenomenon occurred in
Russia, or China or some other

841
00:59:47,789 --> 00:59:50,429
foreign place, that's when CIA

842
00:59:50,429 --> 00:59:56,639
John Greenewald: CIA could,
yeah. Gotcha. Okay. And some of

843
00:59:56,639 --> 00:59:58,829
this controversy, you know, just
want to get your input and then

844
00:59:58,829 --> 01:00:02,849
we could move on some The
controversy about this is what

845
01:00:02,849 --> 01:00:10,439
the public OS app objective list
was, and that without was public

846
01:00:10,439 --> 01:00:15,839
for many years, just even prior
to December 2017, even though we

847
01:00:15,839 --> 01:00:19,469
never knew about OS app until
the next year, but that was

848
01:00:19,469 --> 01:00:24,119
public for quite some time. Zero
mention about any of that. If

849
01:00:24,209 --> 01:00:27,149
you worked in the top secret
world, if they wanted a

850
01:00:27,149 --> 01:00:29,549
paranormal research study that
they would keep highly

851
01:00:29,549 --> 01:00:33,269
classified. Why would they post
anything in public? Why wouldn't

852
01:00:33,269 --> 01:00:39,269
they either do it themselves or
contract in secret? It is, do

853
01:00:39,269 --> 01:00:41,759
you have thoughts on on that,
because I've always been curious

854
01:00:41,759 --> 01:00:45,449
about what was publicly
available versus what we've been

855
01:00:45,449 --> 01:00:47,099
told the program really was?

856
01:00:47,880 --> 01:00:55,830
John Ramirez: Well, first of
all, when they hired bass, that

857
01:00:55,830 --> 01:01:02,550
had to be a detail known to the
public through the RFP process.

858
01:01:03,600 --> 01:01:07,410
You can't just pick a company
said work for us, they had to go

859
01:01:07,860 --> 01:01:11,550
and follow the federal
acquisition regulations on how

860
01:01:11,550 --> 01:01:18,330
to hire an external contractor.
And they did that. So in the

861
01:01:18,330 --> 01:01:25,290
Federal Register, you have to
announce the fact that there is

862
01:01:25,290 --> 01:01:30,210
a contract, and you have to
publish the request for proposal

863
01:01:30,240 --> 01:01:36,270
in the public domain. So the
requirements for such a

864
01:01:36,270 --> 01:01:44,520
capability for this contract,
and the requirements for the

865
01:01:44,520 --> 01:01:49,710
mission and what it needs to
accomplish. It would have to be

866
01:01:49,710 --> 01:01:53,100
publicly known, because how else
can a company then leverage its

867
01:01:53,100 --> 01:01:58,650
resources and its capabilities?
How can they do that? Unless

868
01:01:58,650 --> 01:02:00,150
they know what the government
wants? So they

869
01:02:00,150 --> 01:02:02,190
John Greenewald: are claiming
but well, there's classified

870
01:02:02,520 --> 01:02:06,630
contracts that are awarded to
and you don't? And again, I'm

871
01:02:06,630 --> 01:02:09,720
more asking, not telling you.
But But asking, you know, when

872
01:02:09,720 --> 01:02:13,170
you have a contract, like for a
stealth drone, or something like

873
01:02:13,170 --> 01:02:17,460
that, that in correct me if I'm
wrong, they don't put a an RFP

874
01:02:17,460 --> 01:02:22,470
out for that type of level of
secrecy with the technology they

875
01:02:22,470 --> 01:02:24,240
want to create? Or do they?

876
01:02:24,990 --> 01:02:28,320
John Ramirez: Well, when, okay,
so when, like preamps, or when

877
01:02:28,320 --> 01:02:35,520
the when the F 117 was being
developed. That would be just as

878
01:02:35,520 --> 01:02:43,590
part of another effort to
advance. Aviation, military

879
01:02:43,590 --> 01:02:44,640
aviation, right.

880
01:02:44,670 --> 01:02:47,250
John Greenewald: But Kevin C, in
secret is where I'm going. That

881
01:02:47,250 --> 01:02:47,520
is,

882
01:02:48,420 --> 01:02:50,130
John Ramirez: well, once the
program starts, it will be

883
01:02:50,130 --> 01:03:00,720
classified. But we don't
announce all the details, the

884
01:03:00,720 --> 01:03:04,890
secret details of a program, we
announced just enough to get to

885
01:03:04,890 --> 01:03:08,940
be able to do the market survey,
and to do the technical

886
01:03:08,940 --> 01:03:12,600
evaluation of the responses
coming back from these

887
01:03:12,600 --> 01:03:20,040
companies. And they can be
classified. But the actual

888
01:03:20,040 --> 01:03:24,120
reading of the contract the the
RFP process is not but to your

889
01:03:24,120 --> 01:03:29,550
point. Yeah, once once the RFPs
come back, they can be

890
01:03:29,550 --> 01:03:30,210
classified,

891
01:03:30,870 --> 01:03:34,290
John Greenewald: coming. So and
I'm always fascinated by this

892
01:03:34,290 --> 01:03:38,340
and how it works, because I've
tried to figure it out. So I'm

893
01:03:38,610 --> 01:03:40,980
glad that I have you on just
simply to be able to ask you

894
01:03:40,980 --> 01:03:44,370
this. But when you get into like
the f1 17, I think that was

895
01:03:44,370 --> 01:03:48,660
senior trend was the was the
classified program name.

896
01:03:48,780 --> 01:03:51,840
Obviously, they're not going to
publish senior trend. But there

897
01:03:51,840 --> 01:03:55,410
was an RFP for a program like
that ultimately turned into SR

898
01:03:55,410 --> 01:03:59,940
trend in the F 117. There was
also a half blue is gonna have

899
01:03:59,940 --> 01:04:03,810
blue, there's tastes of blue,
right? SR Spark, right SR Spark,

900
01:04:03,810 --> 01:04:06,390
I think was a CIA one. But the
look back,

901
01:04:06,420 --> 01:04:12,450
John Ramirez: yeah, well, if you
look at remove the labels, and

902
01:04:12,450 --> 01:04:17,670
the intent of that development,
was to study radar absorbing

903
01:04:17,670 --> 01:04:22,680
materials, and not associated
with a craft, or just giving you

904
01:04:22,680 --> 01:04:25,890
an example. If we're going to do
something, we're not going to

905
01:04:25,890 --> 01:04:29,100
say we're doing it for this
purpose. Because we have this

906
01:04:29,100 --> 01:04:32,820
mission and we want to target
this adversary will look step

907
01:04:32,820 --> 01:04:36,960
back and say what technical
capabilities are we looking for,

908
01:04:37,170 --> 01:04:39,720
and we'll publish what we're
looking for in technical

909
01:04:39,720 --> 01:04:44,910
capabilities and not link that
to a specific program until we

910
01:04:44,910 --> 01:04:47,940
hire the contractor with those
technical technical

911
01:04:47,940 --> 01:04:52,320
capabilities. Once a contractor
has been hired, once they go

912
01:04:52,320 --> 01:04:56,310
through the whole process of
acquisition and they're awarded

913
01:04:56,310 --> 01:05:00,000
the contract, then we make sure
that they have the clearance

914
01:05:00,000 --> 01:05:02,370
People because we stipulate in
our RFP what the clearance

915
01:05:02,370 --> 01:05:07,800
levels should be. And then if
they have cleared people, we can

916
01:05:07,800 --> 01:05:15,240
then introduce these contractors
to the program. So we don't have

917
01:05:15,240 --> 01:05:20,340
an RFP for programs necessarily,
we have RFPs, to gather

918
01:05:21,150 --> 01:05:25,980
information on what companies
can do a capability. That's the

919
01:05:25,980 --> 01:05:29,190
best way I can explain it.
Because I used to write RFPs for

920
01:05:29,190 --> 01:05:33,930
CIA. And so we're not saying
that, you know, we want to we

921
01:05:33,930 --> 01:05:38,850
want to study this particular
target. And the Soviet Union

922
01:05:39,240 --> 01:05:41,970
will say, Well, what
capabilities are needed to bring

923
01:05:41,970 --> 01:05:45,960
to bear by this company in order
to do that mission? So do you

924
01:05:45,960 --> 01:05:50,670
have engine electrical engineers
with microwave backgrounds? Do

925
01:05:50,670 --> 01:05:53,880
you have you know, things like
that? Do you have physicists,

926
01:05:53,910 --> 01:05:57,180
you have things like that? So do
you have these people that have

927
01:05:57,180 --> 01:06:02,910
that background? And this in
this broader field? And we pick

928
01:06:02,910 --> 01:06:09,810
a company that answers all that.
And then when we award the

929
01:06:09,810 --> 01:06:13,590
contract, we bring them to CIA?
And then you say, Okay, this is

930
01:06:13,590 --> 01:06:14,520
a program you're working on?

931
01:06:14,580 --> 01:06:17,250
John Greenewald: And there's a
classified aspects. So just to

932
01:06:17,250 --> 01:06:20,130
kind of button that, and I want
to move on to the the present

933
01:06:20,130 --> 01:06:27,240
day stuff. Excuse me. So the
potential contract or who sees

934
01:06:27,270 --> 01:06:31,920
the requirements in the public
realm? They're not aware of the

935
01:06:31,920 --> 01:06:35,340
classified aspects, while they
apply, right? I mean, they're

936
01:06:35,340 --> 01:06:40,230
not fed. He both prior to being
accepted as the contractor,

937
01:06:40,500 --> 01:06:44,220
they're not fed what the
classified aspects are, or are

938
01:06:44,220 --> 01:06:48,150
they so they go off of the
public stuff you need, you know,

939
01:06:48,150 --> 01:06:50,340
this type of expert, this type
of expert, this type of

940
01:06:50,340 --> 01:06:55,530
facility, this type of
clearance, but they're not fed

941
01:06:55,530 --> 01:07:00,930
the nonpublic classified portion
of that contract until they are

942
01:07:00,930 --> 01:07:01,470
chosen

943
01:07:02,310 --> 01:07:05,010
John Ramirez: specific targets,
we're not going to put that in

944
01:07:05,010 --> 01:07:11,970
an RFP, we're not going to put
specific specific tools that we

945
01:07:11,970 --> 01:07:15,960
have that then we it's called
government furnished equipment,

946
01:07:15,960 --> 01:07:19,140
GFP, we're not going to publish
that. We just say, yeah, there's

947
01:07:19,170 --> 01:07:23,520
GFP available, which gives us
the contractor say, okay,

948
01:07:23,520 --> 01:07:25,920
they're going to give me
information or give me tools,

949
01:07:26,250 --> 01:07:29,610
that they're not stipulating
things of that nature. So you're

950
01:07:29,610 --> 01:07:35,220
right, in the sense that we're
not going to publish the target.

951
01:07:35,550 --> 01:07:41,220
Gotcha. A RFP, I was also say
that CIA does not need to

952
01:07:41,310 --> 01:07:48,030
publish any of its RFPs. There's
a cut a carve out for CIA, that

953
01:07:48,030 --> 01:07:51,870
we are not required as part of
the Federal Acquisition

954
01:07:51,870 --> 01:07:56,700
Regulations to actually let out
RFPs in the federal register in

955
01:07:56,700 --> 01:07:57,210
the public.

956
01:07:58,440 --> 01:08:02,130
John Greenewald: Gotcha. Okay. I
think that answered my question

957
01:08:02,130 --> 01:08:05,400
where I was going that with
that, attributing it to us and

958
01:08:05,400 --> 01:08:08,760
something I've talked about for
quite a few years, on if the

959
01:08:08,790 --> 01:08:13,620
paranormal and and UFO aspect
was classified, which I can buy,

960
01:08:14,100 --> 01:08:17,910
and it wouldn't be in the public
announcement, which we've

961
01:08:17,910 --> 01:08:23,460
established his true. How would
Bigelow know to to hit the

962
01:08:23,460 --> 01:08:30,750
jackpot by looking for a secret
UFO program to take part of,

963
01:08:30,960 --> 01:08:34,170
without knowing it was a UFO
secret program, and he was the

964
01:08:34,170 --> 01:08:36,990
only bidder. And I'm not trying
to put you in a weird corner. So

965
01:08:36,990 --> 01:08:40,470
if you don't want to comment on
it, not a problem. I think that

966
01:08:40,470 --> 01:08:42,570
was where I was going with it.
Because I've never had somebody

967
01:08:42,570 --> 01:08:46,380
in your position to give me that
side of it. You wrote the RFPs,

968
01:08:46,380 --> 01:08:49,530
and stuff like that. So that's
why I wanted to ask, but do you

969
01:08:49,530 --> 01:08:50,488
see where I'm going with that?

970
01:08:50,489 --> 01:08:53,909
John Ramirez: I do. I do see
where you're going. I can't

971
01:08:53,909 --> 01:08:58,379
answer for bass or Robert
Bigelow, specifically, because I

972
01:08:58,379 --> 01:09:01,349
wasn't part of that acquisition.
But I can give you the general

973
01:09:01,349 --> 01:09:08,609
case. That it's not a secret
that there there is a corps of

974
01:09:08,609 --> 01:09:13,109
contractors who work with the
Defense Department and work with

975
01:09:13,349 --> 01:09:17,249
the intelligence community and
CIA. There's just a corps of

976
01:09:17,369 --> 01:09:23,219
contractor companies that we go
to all the time. So it's, it's

977
01:09:23,219 --> 01:09:29,099
like this close knit group of
competitors. And so with

978
01:09:29,969 --> 01:09:35,729
Bigelow, I mean, he's done
previous work at Skinwalker. So

979
01:09:35,729 --> 01:09:40,829
he has a lot of knowledge from
the previous work at Skinwalker.

980
01:09:41,039 --> 01:09:45,659
So he has a leg up on anything
that might come out as an RFP.

981
01:09:47,549 --> 01:09:50,819
My understanding is that
Lockheed Martin was interested

982
01:09:50,849 --> 01:09:52,979
in the RFP but dropped it.

983
01:09:54,180 --> 01:09:57,540
John Greenewald: Yeah, there was
a rumor it was reported that

984
01:09:57,540 --> 01:10:01,710
they actually submitted a
proposal hosel and then that was

985
01:10:01,950 --> 01:10:05,490
never officially retracted, but
found out not to be true. When

986
01:10:05,490 --> 01:10:09,000
I'd spoken to the DIA and they
said sole bitter. I mean, I

987
01:10:09,000 --> 01:10:11,580
triple checked that and pressed
him and said, Hey, wait a

988
01:10:11,580 --> 01:10:14,640
minute, you know, and I think I
even brought up Lockheed at the

989
01:10:14,640 --> 01:10:16,410
time. But yeah, it was,

990
01:10:16,920 --> 01:10:21,090
John Ramirez: they may have been
interested. But I think a lot of

991
01:10:21,090 --> 01:10:25,140
companies like Lockheed Martin,
they hire people to do nothing

992
01:10:25,140 --> 01:10:28,380
but contract work. Yeah, they
hire armies of people who know

993
01:10:28,380 --> 01:10:32,760
how to write RFPs. Yeah, and I
mean, these RFPs are so specific

994
01:10:32,760 --> 01:10:36,030
that I used to eliminate, we
used to put in language to see

995
01:10:36,030 --> 01:10:39,540
how compliant a contractor would
be by stipulating the type of

996
01:10:39,540 --> 01:10:45,510
paper, the weight of the paper,
the font, the font used, and the

997
01:10:45,510 --> 01:10:49,800
font size. And we put in every
third page shall be pink, we

998
01:10:49,800 --> 01:10:53,160
make sure that every third page
is pink. Because if the third

999
01:10:53,160 --> 01:10:58,170
page is white, we say you're not
compliant. Tossed. I mean,

1000
01:10:58,170 --> 01:11:01,710
that's how specific we can be.
So these people who know how to

1001
01:11:01,710 --> 01:11:05,160
write this, understand the rules
of the game, look for the fine

1002
01:11:05,160 --> 01:11:09,150
print, look for the fine print,
because they'll answer that RFP,

1003
01:11:09,510 --> 01:11:14,280
specifically. And so as your
specific question about Bigelow

1004
01:11:14,310 --> 01:11:19,230
understanding that I wasn't part
of the acquisition, sure. He's

1005
01:11:19,230 --> 01:11:23,580
queued in to the intelligence
community. We all know that. And

1006
01:11:24,060 --> 01:11:28,590
he may have got wind that such
an effort was going to start and

1007
01:11:28,590 --> 01:11:31,230
he had an RFP go, ready.

1008
01:11:32,670 --> 01:11:34,410
John Greenewald: Ready? Yeah, it
was only up for a couple of

1009
01:11:34,410 --> 01:11:37,590
weeks. And he was the only
bidder. And yeah, and again, you

1010
01:11:37,590 --> 01:11:39,690
know, a lot of people make a big
deal that I bring up the

1011
01:11:39,690 --> 01:11:43,860
sweetheart deal thing for me, it
puts it into perspective of what

1012
01:11:43,860 --> 01:11:48,450
aos app was. But but again,
those are entire shows in

1013
01:11:48,450 --> 01:11:50,850
itself. And I appreciate you
entertaining those questions.

1014
01:11:50,850 --> 01:11:54,240
And yeah, and helping me
understand some of that. I'm at

1015
01:11:54,240 --> 01:11:58,290
the hour mark with you. And I
don't want to take you take up

1016
01:11:58,290 --> 01:12:01,350
your entire day with this. So
let me kind of fast forward from

1017
01:12:01,350 --> 01:12:04,740
the onset days, that regardless
of what was official or not,

1018
01:12:04,800 --> 01:12:10,920
here we are in 2022. Last year,
June, the UAP report was

1019
01:12:11,130 --> 01:12:15,030
published to the public big
letdown to many people. I found

1020
01:12:15,030 --> 01:12:19,020
some gems in it. But obviously
there was a big letdown. There

1021
01:12:19,020 --> 01:12:24,060
are two observations that I had,
I was surprised at so many

1022
01:12:24,330 --> 01:12:28,080
agencies taking part and I put
air quotes because we don't know

1023
01:12:28,230 --> 01:12:31,650
how much parts some of these
took in the report is about 13

1024
01:12:31,650 --> 01:12:35,430
or 14, you know, named here.
I've got it on my screen. The

1025
01:12:35,430 --> 01:12:38,700
second observation I want to
bring up to you is the CIA is

1026
01:12:38,700 --> 01:12:42,090
absent. So just looking at this
sheet, there's the Army, the

1027
01:12:42,090 --> 01:12:45,390
Navy, the Air Force, so
obviously the the obvious ones,

1028
01:12:45,540 --> 01:12:50,430
but the NSA, the NGA, the NRO,
the FBI, the DIA, NOAA, FAA,

1029
01:12:50,430 --> 01:12:55,980
Nga. Nga was duplicated twice in
the report. And so on. ODNI. So

1030
01:12:56,010 --> 01:12:59,010
there's quite a few different
offices and agencies that took

1031
01:12:59,010 --> 01:13:03,480
part but not the CIA. What are
your thoughts about this public

1032
01:13:03,480 --> 01:13:07,800
report, and specifically the
lack of any CIA involvement, at

1033
01:13:07,800 --> 01:13:08,940
least from what we're told?

1034
01:13:09,930 --> 01:13:16,200
John Ramirez: Well, the
department knew that the Senate

1035
01:13:16,320 --> 01:13:21,300
Select Committee on Intelligence
had queued up language for the

1036
01:13:21,690 --> 01:13:28,950
intelligence Authorization Act,
FY 21, about this UAP study, the

1037
01:13:28,950 --> 01:13:33,990
department knew that ahead of
time. And in order to get ahead

1038
01:13:33,990 --> 01:13:41,580
of the narrative. The Department
announced that from its

1039
01:13:41,580 --> 01:13:47,670
understanding, in June, when the
IAEA language became public, the

1040
01:13:47,670 --> 01:13:50,940
department got ahead of the
narrative, and said, Well, we're

1041
01:13:50,940 --> 01:13:54,330
not going to wait for this IAEA
to be signed, because then

1042
01:13:54,330 --> 01:13:58,620
Congress would drive US Congress
would be in charge, we're going

1043
01:13:58,620 --> 01:14:02,250
to get ahead of the narrative,
and create this UAP Task Force

1044
01:14:02,280 --> 01:14:08,220
and announce it and put the Navy
in charge. And so then we can

1045
01:14:08,220 --> 01:14:13,620
then stipulate what the scope of
this investigation is going to

1046
01:14:13,620 --> 01:14:19,260
be not Congress. And so that's
what happened. In my opinion.

1047
01:14:19,290 --> 01:14:23,430
Now, you might talk to other
analysts who may disagree with

1048
01:14:23,430 --> 01:14:27,480
that. But I've seen that happen
before, where the government

1049
01:14:27,480 --> 01:14:30,630
will get ahead of the narrative
by saying, oh, we'll do it.

1050
01:14:30,990 --> 01:14:33,840
We'll do it. Don't legislate it.
You can put the language in the

1051
01:14:33,840 --> 01:14:37,260
legislation. But don't worry,
you'll get what you need. So

1052
01:14:37,260 --> 01:14:40,470
that's what the department did,
I believe, to get ahead of the

1053
01:14:40,470 --> 01:14:44,310
narrative. So if you look at the
announcement in August, and you

1054
01:14:44,310 --> 01:14:48,780
look at the report release in
late June, they had more than

1055
01:14:48,780 --> 01:14:54,420
180 days to do this. They had a
better part of a full year to do

1056
01:14:54,420 --> 01:15:00,120
this, because they wanted to
control the narrative. And so I

1057
01:15:00,120 --> 01:15:01,260
believe that's what happened.

1058
01:15:01,650 --> 01:15:03,330
John Greenewald: It looks like
they only took like three hours

1059
01:15:03,330 --> 01:15:04,560
to put it together, though,

1060
01:15:04,950 --> 01:15:07,890
John Ramirez: let me I'll
address that. CIA was not

1061
01:15:07,890 --> 01:15:11,790
involved because this effort was
Department of Defense title 10.

1062
01:15:12,240 --> 01:15:15,960
CIA is not part of title 10, the
Secretary of Defense cannot

1063
01:15:16,110 --> 01:15:20,790
order the CIA to do anything, or
participate in anything. If

1064
01:15:20,790 --> 01:15:23,760
anything, it's going to be a
request to the director of CIA,

1065
01:15:24,120 --> 01:15:27,810
you know, we invite you to this
to this report. They did not do

1066
01:15:27,810 --> 01:15:31,110
that, because the department
wanted to limit the scope of the

1067
01:15:31,110 --> 01:15:36,330
report to just what was publicly
released in 2017. That is,

1068
01:15:37,980 --> 01:15:45,000
November, I think, was
1227 2000. For the first tic tac

1069
01:15:45,540 --> 01:15:49,200
and Nimitz battle group. That's
the start, and we're gonna end

1070
01:15:49,200 --> 01:15:54,360
it like, sometime in 2021. Yeah,
that's it. That's the scope of

1071
01:15:54,360 --> 01:15:58,290
the report. We don't want CIA to
bring in its historical

1072
01:15:58,290 --> 01:16:02,610
knowledge of everything to
happen since Roswell. That's not

1073
01:16:02,610 --> 01:16:05,010
going to be part of the report,
we want to just hit the

1074
01:16:05,010 --> 01:16:05,670
military.

1075
01:16:06,330 --> 01:16:09,090
John Greenewald: So you think it
was strategic to not include

1076
01:16:09,090 --> 01:16:13,380
CIA, not just because it was a
limitation of SecDef? And his,

1077
01:16:13,530 --> 01:16:17,010
you know, mandate? Because I
mean, the FAA is in their SEC,

1078
01:16:17,010 --> 01:16:18,930
that doesn't have any, you know,
exactly.

1079
01:16:19,320 --> 01:16:23,130
John Ramirez: That's a good
point. Because, you know, if

1080
01:16:23,130 --> 01:16:27,900
they added CI, we'll see I
wasn't invited. And CI had no

1081
01:16:27,900 --> 01:16:31,440
way of legally inserting itself
into the report. It was

1082
01:16:31,440 --> 01:16:33,600
Secretary defense type of time.
So can I

1083
01:16:33,600 --> 01:16:36,450
John Greenewald: ask, do you
know, for 100% fact that they

1084
01:16:36,450 --> 01:16:41,070
weren't invited? They were not
invited? There were no put your

1085
01:16:41,070 --> 01:16:44,430
call? And I'm only asking
because I don't know. But so you

1086
01:16:44,430 --> 01:16:49,230
don't think there was a any type
of requests? And it was the CIA

1087
01:16:49,230 --> 01:16:53,040
that said, hey, no, I don't want
we're not SecDef got no

1088
01:16:53,070 --> 01:16:56,160
jurisdiction over us. So we're
not going to contribute. So you

1089
01:16:56,160 --> 01:16:59,550
know, for a fact that there was
never a line extended to CIA.

1090
01:17:02,010 --> 01:17:05,190
John Ramirez: I can't reveal why
I know that. Okay. I do know

1091
01:17:05,190 --> 01:17:10,740
that they were not formally
invited to participate in the

1092
01:17:10,770 --> 01:17:14,880
Navy UAP Task Force at all.

1093
01:17:15,750 --> 01:17:19,140
John Greenewald: Now about the
the new effort the aeoi, MSG

1094
01:17:21,450 --> 01:17:25,800
UAP, tf is going away. aeoi MSG
is coming aboard. Do you feel

1095
01:17:25,800 --> 01:17:28,920
that there will be coordination
there? Or do you think CIA is

1096
01:17:28,920 --> 01:17:29,580
still going to be

1097
01:17:30,480 --> 01:17:32,790
John Ramirez: the law states
that needs to be coordination

1098
01:17:32,790 --> 01:17:36,720
between the Secretary of Defense
in coordination with the

1099
01:17:36,720 --> 01:17:40,080
Director of National
Intelligence. And so that's a

1100
01:17:40,320 --> 01:17:47,580
way for CIA to participate in a
MSG. And also, there is the

1101
01:17:47,820 --> 01:17:53,070
intelligence Authorization Act,
FY 22, where I'm not sure where

1102
01:17:53,070 --> 01:17:55,860
that went, but there was
language in there, that was

1103
01:17:56,070 --> 01:18:03,060
somewhat different. The NDA
tends to say, Okay, secretary of

1104
01:18:03,060 --> 01:18:08,400
defense, you need to have the
coordination of DNI to do this

1105
01:18:08,430 --> 01:18:21,660
group aeoi MSG. But in the IAEA,
its tells the DNI Okay. April

1106
01:18:21,660 --> 01:18:27,930
Haynes, you need to get the
cooperation of the Department of

1107
01:18:27,930 --> 01:18:33,420
Defense, the Secretary of
Defense to do this legislation

1108
01:18:34,710 --> 01:18:40,920
stipulated program. So on the,
on the NDA side, It's 180 day

1109
01:18:40,920 --> 01:18:46,380
interval report. On the IA psi,
it's a 90 day interval report.

1110
01:18:47,370 --> 01:18:50,490
So it's like two different
pieces of legislation. And I

1111
01:18:50,490 --> 01:18:54,870
don't know if the IA language
for UAPs is still in there. It's

1112
01:18:54,870 --> 01:19:01,110
much shorter. The NDAA is much
broader, much in depth, and so

1113
01:19:01,140 --> 01:19:04,650
I'm not sure what happened to
it. But there's two pieces of

1114
01:19:04,650 --> 01:19:07,320
legislation. And I don't know
how they're gonna resolve who's

1115
01:19:07,320 --> 01:19:12,480
in charge, because on the Senate
side, IAEA, it's the DNI getting

1116
01:19:12,480 --> 01:19:16,350
the cooperation as Secretary of
Defense on the NDAA side, which

1117
01:19:16,350 --> 01:19:19,530
came out of the House Armed
Services Committee. It is then

1118
01:19:19,530 --> 01:19:24,990
the or, yeah, I think I'm right.
It's the it's the cooperation of

1119
01:19:24,990 --> 01:19:27,870
the DNI underneath the Secretary
of Defense.

1120
01:19:27,960 --> 01:19:30,450
John Greenewald: Yeah, I'm glad
it's not confusing at all, John,

1121
01:19:30,450 --> 01:19:30,990
because,

1122
01:19:31,679 --> 01:19:36,059
John Ramirez: well, I mean, I'm
upset at the aeoi. The MSG part.

1123
01:19:36,299 --> 01:19:40,889
Yeah. Because that's management
synchronization. Yeah. Me

1124
01:19:40,889 --> 01:19:46,349
implies. Okay. Department. Let's
get our story straight of what

1125
01:19:46,349 --> 01:19:49,079
we tell Congress. Why is it
called management

1126
01:19:49,079 --> 01:19:52,379
synchronization? Management
synchronizing? What

1127
01:19:52,770 --> 01:19:53,340
John Greenewald: Yeah,

1128
01:19:53,400 --> 01:19:57,330
John Ramirez: you know, object.
Airborne object identification,

1129
01:19:57,330 --> 01:20:01,200
that sounds great, but when you
manage the identification and

1130
01:20:01,200 --> 01:20:04,350
synchronize in a vacation
according to what the department

1131
01:20:04,350 --> 01:20:08,940
wants, that tends to tell me
that we're not going to get a

1132
01:20:08,940 --> 01:20:10,590
lot of what we really want.

1133
01:20:12,150 --> 01:20:14,220
John Greenewald: You know, I'm
at the tail end of the time that

1134
01:20:14,220 --> 01:20:18,780
I have with you, and I really
appreciate your time. If I can

1135
01:20:18,810 --> 01:20:21,360
just ask you one one last
question with your time in the

1136
01:20:21,360 --> 01:20:24,570
in the CIA and, and it sounds
like you've had a lot of

1137
01:20:24,570 --> 01:20:28,350
knowledge over the years that
now you're being able to, to

1138
01:20:28,350 --> 01:20:32,820
come out with, do you have any
regrets over the last, you know,

1139
01:20:32,820 --> 01:20:38,580
25 years with your career of the
CIA or, or, you know, even post

1140
01:20:38,580 --> 01:20:41,250
retirement anything that you
look back and wanted to do

1141
01:20:41,250 --> 01:20:42,420
different with your time?

1142
01:20:42,780 --> 01:20:45,870
John Ramirez: Well, knowing that
the working group started in

1143
01:20:46,260 --> 01:20:50,190
around late 2004 and went
through 2005, I was chief of the

1144
01:20:50,190 --> 01:20:54,690
Elan Analysis Branch. My regret
was not hiring Eric W. Davis,

1145
01:20:54,690 --> 01:20:58,410
when he applied for a job at
CIA. And that was my deepest

1146
01:20:58,410 --> 01:21:01,140
regret, knowing what his
capabilities are, and knowing

1147
01:21:01,290 --> 01:21:04,500
participation in the study of
this phenomenon. I wish I would

1148
01:21:04,500 --> 01:21:06,720
have hired him, because I would
have sent him to the working

1149
01:21:06,720 --> 01:21:06,960
group.

1150
01:21:07,110 --> 01:21:10,560
John Greenewald: So Dr. Eric
Davis had applied for the CIA,

1151
01:21:10,830 --> 01:21:15,390
in your, in the eland, the make
sure I have it. electronic

1152
01:21:15,390 --> 01:21:17,010
intelligence analysis branch,

1153
01:21:17,040 --> 01:21:21,090
John Ramirez: he actually apply
for a broader jab job category

1154
01:21:21,210 --> 01:21:27,930
known as St. W, but scientific,
technical and weapons. And so

1155
01:21:27,960 --> 01:21:33,840
that is usually the place where
scientists, physicists,

1156
01:21:33,930 --> 01:21:37,380
chemists, biologists, you name
it, electrical engineers,

1157
01:21:37,380 --> 01:21:41,130
mechanical engineers, that's the
job category that they would

1158
01:21:41,130 --> 01:21:45,990
check off when they apply for a
job. So he was St. W. And so his

1159
01:21:45,990 --> 01:21:54,270
resume in his application
package, went to hiring advisors

1160
01:21:54,600 --> 01:21:57,690
in the weapons intelligence
nonproliferation Arms Control

1161
01:21:57,690 --> 01:22:02,130
Center, my parent office. So
it's logical that it went to

1162
01:22:02,160 --> 01:22:05,580
knowing the structure of wind
pack, it would have gone to the

1163
01:22:05,580 --> 01:22:09,450
missile and space group, and
particularly in the space group,

1164
01:22:09,990 --> 01:22:13,050
because of his background, and
it also perhaps in the missile

1165
01:22:13,050 --> 01:22:18,540
group, missile part of the MSG.
And I believe he had interviews

1166
01:22:18,540 --> 01:22:24,900
because I learned about his
application from my colleague,

1167
01:22:24,990 --> 01:22:32,430
branch chief, who was chief of
management in CIA. And he

1168
01:22:32,430 --> 01:22:36,300
interviewed Eric Davis after he
came downstairs and escorted

1169
01:22:36,300 --> 01:22:42,930
downstairs to this signature.
Branch. And he was interviewed

1170
01:22:42,930 --> 01:22:43,350
there.

1171
01:22:44,430 --> 01:22:46,290
John Greenewald: Have you? I'm
just curious, have you talked

1172
01:22:46,290 --> 01:22:49,200
about that before? publicly?

1173
01:22:49,380 --> 01:22:53,340
John Ramirez: No, no. But if you
ask me, like, what's my deepest

1174
01:22:53,340 --> 01:22:57,240
regret? I deeply regret that,
because he would have just been

1175
01:22:57,240 --> 01:23:01,290
saying individual talk to and
because I looked at his it's

1176
01:23:01,290 --> 01:23:04,950
more than a resume is more like
a CV. I mean, he listed a lot of

1177
01:23:04,950 --> 01:23:11,010
detail. And it's an a CV, and
knowing his background. I wish I

1178
01:23:11,010 --> 01:23:13,470
would have hired him, in
hindsight, knowing that there

1179
01:23:13,470 --> 01:23:18,450
was a OHRP Working Group
starting up. Yeah. But the

1180
01:23:18,480 --> 01:23:24,240
signature, Branch Chief
signatures Branch Chief had it

1181
01:23:24,240 --> 01:23:29,940
me his application package for
me to review. And I noticed that

1182
01:23:29,940 --> 01:23:32,490
you know, this is a brilliant
guy. I mean, no doubt about it.

1183
01:23:32,490 --> 01:23:37,560
He is brilliant. Beyond Belief,
I mean, outstanding guy. And I

1184
01:23:37,560 --> 01:23:40,710
looked at the projects he worked
for, for the Air Force Research

1185
01:23:40,710 --> 01:23:49,110
Lab. I read his paper, CIA has a
requirement to submit writing

1186
01:23:49,110 --> 01:23:52,350
samples, particularly in the
director of intelligence was all

1187
01:23:52,350 --> 01:23:57,210
about writing. Yeah. And He
submitted his paper on

1188
01:23:57,510 --> 01:24:04,260
teleportation physics, which I
read. And it was dated 2004. And

1189
01:24:04,260 --> 01:24:07,500
I remember oh, this is a recent
paper, because it was the same

1190
01:24:07,500 --> 01:24:12,450
calendar year later, after he
published that paper for AF FRL.

1191
01:24:13,680 --> 01:24:18,630
But he, he was in the building
on escorted, escorted, he had to

1192
01:24:18,630 --> 01:24:22,920
have an escort. And that means
that he did not have a top

1193
01:24:22,920 --> 01:24:27,510
secret sei clearance that he
passed to us. He didn't pass

1194
01:24:27,510 --> 01:24:31,620
clearances to us to get a
different kind of badge instead

1195
01:24:31,620 --> 01:24:35,310
of a visitor's badge that
required an escort. Okay, all

1196
01:24:35,310 --> 01:24:43,350
times even going to the
bathroom. He he does the badge

1197
01:24:43,350 --> 01:24:47,880
he had and he did not have the
no escort required badge, which

1198
01:24:47,880 --> 01:24:51,510
means that you passed your
clearances at the SEI level. Do

1199
01:24:51,510 --> 01:24:55,110
you remember what year this was?
If I may ask 2004 Because when I

1200
01:24:55,110 --> 01:24:59,010
looked at his paper,
teleportation physics, I

1201
01:24:59,010 --> 01:25:02,100
remarked Oh, this is A very
recent paper he just he just

1202
01:25:02,130 --> 01:25:04,800
John Greenewald: published it.
So that means he didn't have any

1203
01:25:04,800 --> 01:25:06,960
clearance or didn't have a top
secret. He didn't have a top

1204
01:25:06,960 --> 01:25:07,290
secret

1205
01:25:07,290 --> 01:25:11,640
John Ramirez: SCI clearance.
Okay. And when it to CIA for

1206
01:25:11,640 --> 01:25:14,940
those interviews, I

1207
01:25:14,940 --> 01:25:16,980
John Greenewald: have to if you
don't mind, can I take you for a

1208
01:25:16,980 --> 01:25:22,110
couple more minutes? Are you
okay? So with that, the two

1209
01:25:22,110 --> 01:25:24,870
questions I have and one you may
not be able to answer, but very

1210
01:25:24,870 --> 01:25:27,720
quickly was he hired but I know
you said you didn't hire him but

1211
01:25:27,720 --> 01:25:29,070
did somebody else at CIA.

1212
01:25:31,470 --> 01:25:34,260
John Ramirez: My part of impact
did not hire the signature

1213
01:25:34,860 --> 01:25:41,460
branch, the eland branch. We
didn't hire him. And he wasn't I

1214
01:25:41,460 --> 01:25:44,940
did not see him and went pack
spaces. In the places that I

1215
01:25:44,940 --> 01:25:47,700
should see him at that missile
and space group Park. I'm sure

1216
01:25:48,450 --> 01:25:52,350
he wasn't in there. So not to
say that somebody might have

1217
01:25:52,350 --> 01:25:56,700
seen his his application package
and may say, Hey, this is a

1218
01:25:56,700 --> 01:25:58,530
great guy that we can consult,

1219
01:25:58,530 --> 01:26:00,570
John Greenewald: bring him over
here. Yeah, gotcha. Yeah, you

1220
01:26:00,570 --> 01:26:01,260
guys die.

1221
01:26:01,380 --> 01:26:04,140
John Ramirez: But we, we didn't
we didn't hire him as a blue

1222
01:26:04,140 --> 01:26:07,950
badge employee, not to say that
he may have. He may have

1223
01:26:07,950 --> 01:26:11,550
attracted enough interest to be
introduced to other people in

1224
01:26:11,550 --> 01:26:15,570
the IC saying, Hey, this guy,
you know, he's very interesting.

1225
01:26:15,600 --> 01:26:18,840
We didn't hire him as a blue
badge staffer, but you might be

1226
01:26:18,840 --> 01:26:22,050
interested in it. I don't know
if he's served as a consult of

1227
01:26:22,050 --> 01:26:25,170
capacity at all. As an
independent contractor. I don't

1228
01:26:25,170 --> 01:26:27,930
have that knowledge. I do know
he was escorted because my

1229
01:26:27,930 --> 01:26:34,800
engineer escorted him down the
hall to a snack. Stan, and CIA

1230
01:26:34,800 --> 01:26:38,250
officers are no it's Ron and
Sally snacks down on the ground

1231
01:26:38,250 --> 01:26:41,700
floor where my branch was
located. Yeah, Ron and Sally.

1232
01:26:42,060 --> 01:26:46,290
Ron was blind. And he was very
affectionately liked by all CIA

1233
01:26:46,290 --> 01:26:49,500
officers who served during when
they had snacks. So that

1234
01:26:49,500 --> 01:26:54,120
validates, okay. Yeah, Ron and
Sally snacks. And my, my

1235
01:26:54,120 --> 01:26:56,850
engineer that I did sent it all
or working group, one of them

1236
01:26:57,150 --> 01:27:00,420
was escorting him. And he was
introduced to a colleague of

1237
01:27:00,420 --> 01:27:04,680
mine, and another branch, who I
witnessed the fact that oh,

1238
01:27:04,680 --> 01:27:06,450
yeah, he just had a visitor's
badge.

1239
01:27:07,110 --> 01:27:10,920
John Greenewald: Wow. So this
was 2004. He said, and yeah, I

1240
01:27:10,920 --> 01:27:13,710
always like to put everything in
chronological order, because

1241
01:27:13,710 --> 01:27:16,590
that's the best way to put
together a puzzle. But I, I,

1242
01:27:16,650 --> 01:27:19,650
you're familiar with the Eric
Davis, Thomas Wilson notes,

1243
01:27:19,650 --> 01:27:22,770
whatever you want to call them.
I've done quite a few different

1244
01:27:22,770 --> 01:27:25,830
videos on it. I'm a huge skeptic
when it comes to these notes.

1245
01:27:26,790 --> 01:27:29,610
But since you have this kind of
knowledge around the timeframe,

1246
01:27:29,610 --> 01:27:35,100
it was allegedly October of
2002, when Eric Davis met with

1247
01:27:35,400 --> 01:27:40,500
allegedly Admiral Thomas Wilson
and Wilson, as a J. Two decided

1248
01:27:40,500 --> 01:27:44,760
to spill all these, you know,
highly classified secrets in Las

1249
01:27:44,760 --> 01:27:48,450
Vegas. Based on what you've
seen, do you have an opinion on

1250
01:27:48,450 --> 01:27:53,130
those notes? And if he's not
cleared, why would Wilson then I

1251
01:27:53,130 --> 01:27:55,800
really want to ask the question,
why would Wilson do that?

1252
01:27:56,790 --> 01:27:59,970
John Ramirez: Well, I'm Eric
Davis was a member of an

1253
01:27:59,970 --> 01:28:02,610
organization. I'm a member of
the association, former

1254
01:28:02,610 --> 01:28:06,030
intelligence officers. And you
don't have to be an intelligence

1255
01:28:06,030 --> 01:28:12,510
officer to be a member of the
AFI Oh, you just have to be a

1256
01:28:12,510 --> 01:28:17,400
person who has worked with
intelligence or work with the

1257
01:28:17,400 --> 01:28:22,680
military intelligence side. And
so he knew people who were in

1258
01:28:22,680 --> 01:28:27,150
the Las Vegas chapter because he
was a member. And the last Vegas

1259
01:28:27,150 --> 01:28:33,120
chapter members about vouched
for Eric Davis to Admiral

1260
01:28:33,120 --> 01:28:37,170
Wilson. So that was one of the
ways to Admiral Wilson, you that

1261
01:28:37,170 --> 01:28:40,170
Eric gave us was real deal in
terms of, you know, the fact

1262
01:28:40,170 --> 01:28:43,080
that he is associated in some
way with the intelligence

1263
01:28:43,080 --> 01:28:44,520
community or with military,

1264
01:28:44,820 --> 01:28:47,520
John Greenewald: according to
the story or you have knowledge

1265
01:28:47,520 --> 01:28:50,820
of that. He's a member of the
AFI. Oh, yeah. No, no, I

1266
01:28:50,820 --> 01:28:53,790
understand that I'm talking
about the vouching to Admiral

1267
01:28:53,790 --> 01:28:57,390
Wilson. Is that a story you've
heard? Or you have direct

1268
01:28:57,390 --> 01:28:58,320
knowledge? No, that's,

1269
01:28:58,350 --> 01:29:01,350
John Ramirez: that's based on a
good point that you have John,

1270
01:29:01,380 --> 01:29:03,510
that was based on reading the
notes.

1271
01:29:04,410 --> 01:29:07,590
John Greenewald: Okay, gotcha.
So, so we're going out, gotcha.

1272
01:29:08,700 --> 01:29:11,400
John Ramirez: The other thing
that I have knowledge of is that

1273
01:29:13,770 --> 01:29:18,690
he EMG is the we call the
operations operations and

1274
01:29:18,690 --> 01:29:23,580
maintenance contractor for area
51. They run the security, they

1275
01:29:23,580 --> 01:29:28,170
provide all of the services,
just the logistical support of

1276
01:29:28,170 --> 01:29:32,580
running that facility. And it
may provide some analytic

1277
01:29:32,580 --> 01:29:36,930
support as well. That's
interesting that I went to E and

1278
01:29:36,930 --> 01:29:44,190
G. When I was at a facility next
to area 51. I went to the DOE

1279
01:29:46,140 --> 01:29:51,030
facility to get batched so I was
surprised that occurred an EE

1280
01:29:51,030 --> 01:29:55,350
G's parking lot. According to
the notes, I didn't know why

1281
01:29:55,380 --> 01:29:57,930
that would be but maybe Mr.
Wilson had some business there

1282
01:29:57,930 --> 01:29:59,670
to do. Do you feel that

1283
01:29:59,670 --> 01:30:02,040
John Greenewald: happened? Just
out of curiosity based on?

1284
01:30:03,449 --> 01:30:06,329
John Ramirez: Well, as you know,
I say, embrace widely hold

1285
01:30:06,329 --> 01:30:10,529
lightly. And since I don't have
any first hand knowledge, I hold

1286
01:30:10,529 --> 01:30:14,159
that lightly. But I embrace it
widely that it's possible that

1287
01:30:14,159 --> 01:30:17,249
could have occurred. What I
don't believe occurred was

1288
01:30:17,249 --> 01:30:20,489
Admiral Wilson salt that
memorandum allegedly from the

1289
01:30:20,489 --> 01:30:23,789
NRO and said, by golly, I need
to get to the bottom of this.

1290
01:30:23,879 --> 01:30:25,499
That is complete nonsense.

1291
01:30:26,039 --> 01:30:28,889
John Greenewald: I did a pretty
big breakdown of that, the that

1292
01:30:28,889 --> 01:30:34,769
memo and and how that anchored
the whole story. And that that,

1293
01:30:34,769 --> 01:30:37,829
to me, is one of the biggest
tells in my opinion. Again, this

1294
01:30:37,829 --> 01:30:41,849
is just my opinion, on why
there's not a whole lot of truth

1295
01:30:41,849 --> 01:30:46,499
to this, because the entire
story hinges on that memo. And

1296
01:30:46,499 --> 01:30:49,319
in my opinion, the memos bunk,
you brought up the memo, if

1297
01:30:49,319 --> 01:30:52,289
you're familiar with a Do you
feel that the memos bunk yet is

1298
01:30:52,319 --> 01:30:56,219
completely bunk? So you So you
agree that that memo was just

1299
01:30:56,369 --> 01:30:56,939
not wasn't

1300
01:30:56,940 --> 01:30:59,190
John Ramirez: the that wasn't
the impetus for Admiral Wilson

1301
01:31:06,929 --> 01:30:59,580
to

1302
01:31:06,929 --> 01:31:09,539
mean, that that's the legend
anyway. And that's, that's the

1303
01:31:09,539 --> 01:31:13,019
story. So for me, it falls apart
from there. But again, going

1304
01:31:13,019 --> 01:31:16,859
back to what you feel, I mean,
do you feel there's any truth to

1305
01:31:16,859 --> 01:31:17,609
that story?

1306
01:31:20,340 --> 01:31:28,140
John Ramirez: I would give some
possibility that Eric Davis was

1307
01:31:28,140 --> 01:31:34,980
known to Admiral Wilson in some
capacity. That's me being very

1308
01:31:34,980 --> 01:31:38,700
generous. I don't think they
were like 100% complete

1309
01:31:38,700 --> 01:31:43,320
strangers. I don't think Admiral
Wilson would look at our gave us

1310
01:31:43,320 --> 01:31:47,100
and who is this guy? Because
Eric Davis worked closely with

1311
01:31:47,100 --> 01:31:52,650
the Air Force Research Lab. And
so I would imagine that someone

1312
01:31:52,680 --> 01:31:56,880
in the capacity of j to the
joint chiefs of staff would know

1313
01:31:56,880 --> 01:32:01,800
about with the work of the AF
RL. And so in that capacity,

1314
01:32:01,830 --> 01:32:06,630
there might be some linkage
there. But to say that, Admiral

1315
01:32:06,630 --> 01:32:11,400
Wilson wanted to speak with Eric
Davis because he sought this

1316
01:32:11,460 --> 01:32:15,240
memorandum. Admiral Wilson was
look at that, and no, it was

1317
01:32:15,240 --> 01:32:20,670
completely faked. Yeah, I was
eland and it listed eland What

1318
01:32:20,670 --> 01:32:25,170
is it Elan ops. There's no such
thing as Elan ops. I was eland I

1319
01:32:25,170 --> 01:32:29,760
know people at NSA eland I know
the Elan community throughout

1320
01:32:29,760 --> 01:32:33,090
the military, military
intelligence side and the

1321
01:32:33,360 --> 01:32:37,140
civilian IC side. There's no
such thing as Elan ops or you

1322
01:32:37,140 --> 01:32:42,060
know, all these other they put
us address C's in the format was

1323
01:32:42,060 --> 01:32:46,080
a complete wrong. Central
Security Service is the uniform

1324
01:32:46,080 --> 01:32:49,830
cryptologic service elements at
NSA. They're the people wearing

1325
01:32:49,830 --> 01:32:53,850
uniforms, members of the
military who work at NSA in the

1326
01:32:53,850 --> 01:33:00,570
second field, in our role in our
roles. organization chart would

1327
01:33:00,570 --> 01:33:03,780
not have central security
services there. Yeah. And in a

1328
01:33:03,780 --> 01:33:05,700
row, it's not part of the Air
Force folks.

1329
01:33:05,939 --> 01:33:07,229
John Greenewald: Yeah. You know,

1330
01:33:07,229 --> 01:33:09,179
John Ramirez: there's a lot of
times I mean, so yeah, a lot of

1331
01:33:09,179 --> 01:33:12,719
problems. And plus all of the
units that list down, I have a

1332
01:33:12,719 --> 01:33:16,649
list of where every unit was
stationed. And, you know, I find

1333
01:33:16,649 --> 01:33:20,489
it strange that one of the wings
fighter wings was stationed at

1334
01:33:20,489 --> 01:33:27,359
Tinker Air Force Base in
Oklahoma. And so why would you

1335
01:33:27,359 --> 01:33:31,829
know, this, the entire intent
was of the memo was? Oh, you

1336
01:33:31,829 --> 01:33:35,549
know, we found out that these
UFO researchers are going to be

1337
01:33:35,549 --> 01:33:39,239
at the little alien N and Rachel
LaMotta. And we want to shut

1338
01:33:39,239 --> 01:33:43,559
down all operations. Right? And
they listed like some of these

1339
01:33:43,559 --> 01:33:46,559
units in the Air Force, they're
real units, somebody did their

1340
01:33:46,559 --> 01:33:50,759
homework, but they just pick and
chose pick and choose, like,

1341
01:33:51,119 --> 01:33:55,289
cafeteria style, or what sounds
good. You know, what, what can

1342
01:33:55,289 --> 01:34:00,659
we find that may have had some
associated area 51 Just throw it

1343
01:34:00,659 --> 01:34:04,499
in the report. So I mean, I have
a lot of problems with that

1344
01:34:04,529 --> 01:34:07,199
mission operations. Moc, by the
way stands for Mission

1345
01:34:07,199 --> 01:34:11,249
Operations Center, that sort of
stand for and a note like that

1346
01:34:11,249 --> 01:34:13,979
it was legitimate. We're not go
to the LCS of these

1347
01:34:13,979 --> 01:34:21,449
organizations, or these fighter
wings. Every every unit involved

1348
01:34:21,479 --> 01:34:27,089
in intelligence would have a
SSL, every Pentagon unit, every

1349
01:34:27,089 --> 01:34:30,689
department of defense unit will
have an SSL, a special security

1350
01:34:30,689 --> 01:34:34,199
office and that's the recipient.
And for the top part, it

1351
01:34:34,199 --> 01:34:39,809
wouldn't go to Elan Mo, even
ops. Yeah, it was said NSA s to

1352
01:34:40,139 --> 01:34:41,009
SSL.

1353
01:34:42,450 --> 01:34:45,630
John Greenewald: Yeah, it was.
It was definitely a mess. Let me

1354
01:34:45,660 --> 01:34:49,980
the final question. Bottom line
real quick, beyond the memo,

1355
01:34:50,010 --> 01:34:55,170
because then the biggest
supporters of this story, have

1356
01:34:55,170 --> 01:34:59,070
kind of dismissed my critique of
the memo saying oh, well then

1357
01:34:59,100 --> 01:35:02,340
the memo is not a big deal. deal
anymore to the story, even

1358
01:35:02,340 --> 01:35:04,890
though it's been bantered about
since day one. But now we take

1359
01:35:04,890 --> 01:35:07,230
that out. And it's like, oh,
well, it's not a big deal. So

1360
01:35:07,230 --> 01:35:09,570
let's take the memo out of the
equation, you look at the notes,

1361
01:35:09,570 --> 01:35:13,650
you look at the idea and concept
that Wilson would would spill

1362
01:35:13,650 --> 01:35:16,140
the secrets, I know, you said
that it's a possibility that he

1363
01:35:16,140 --> 01:35:20,700
would know him. And or know of
him. Write with your experience

1364
01:35:20,700 --> 01:35:25,800
being top secret sei cleared
working for the CIA. And, again,

1365
01:35:25,800 --> 01:35:29,430
this bio is amazing. So it kind
of speaks for itself with your

1366
01:35:29,430 --> 01:35:33,300
intelligence, background and
clearances. Do you see that

1367
01:35:33,300 --> 01:35:37,770
happening with a j two.

1368
01:35:41,939 --> 01:35:46,619
John Ramirez: With a J. Two, at
his position in the Joint Chiefs

1369
01:35:46,619 --> 01:35:52,379
of Staff, the possibility that
he may not be aware of the

1370
01:35:52,769 --> 01:35:58,709
programmatic details, I find
that to be credible. But he

1371
01:35:58,709 --> 01:36:03,839
would know the fact of that they
might be an effort to reverse

1372
01:36:03,839 --> 01:36:08,699
engineer some of these craft. So
that's one level, but to know

1373
01:36:08,699 --> 01:36:13,319
where it's being done, to know
how much money is being placed

1374
01:36:13,349 --> 01:36:19,229
in these programs, to know like
results of these programs, to

1375
01:36:19,229 --> 01:36:23,669
actually go to these these
facilities and see these craft

1376
01:36:26,279 --> 01:36:31,709
that go either way, depending on
how sensitive that program

1377
01:36:31,919 --> 01:36:36,809
really is, and what I can bring
from personal experience that I

1378
01:36:36,809 --> 01:36:42,299
was involved in a controlled
access program at CIA. And I had

1379
01:36:42,299 --> 01:36:46,979
the biggest list for that
program. And as the program was

1380
01:36:46,979 --> 01:36:50,789
winding down, I was given the
biggest list, I was made the

1381
01:36:50,819 --> 01:36:55,199
control officer for the program,
a job I did not relish and I got

1382
01:36:55,199 --> 01:37:00,599
rid of as fast as I could. But I
was given a big list. And on the

1383
01:37:00,599 --> 01:37:05,399
bucket list were the names,
birth dates and social security

1384
01:37:05,639 --> 01:37:11,939
numbers of the current president
and former presidents. So I know

1385
01:37:11,939 --> 01:37:16,469
that you know, that bigger list
is everything. And but you know,

1386
01:37:16,469 --> 01:37:21,209
I didn't see this program was
something that James McCaskey

1387
01:37:21,899 --> 01:37:27,119
would have interested because it
was part of his job to look at

1388
01:37:27,179 --> 01:37:30,179
ballistic missiles and ballistic
missile defense. So we were

1389
01:37:30,179 --> 01:37:36,629
collecting at a covert facility,
this data, and I did not see any

1390
01:37:36,659 --> 01:37:41,819
very many dia people on it. In
fact, the DIA people would have

1391
01:37:41,819 --> 01:37:44,789
been at missile and space
Intelligence Center in

1392
01:37:44,789 --> 01:37:49,259
Huntsville, Alabama. And they
were not on it. In fact, Neysa

1393
01:37:49,319 --> 01:37:52,799
Air National Air and Space
Intelligence Center, they were

1394
01:37:52,799 --> 01:37:57,269
not on it. It was just CIA,
State Department because we need

1395
01:37:57,269 --> 01:38:02,849
an entry into that country. And
the President, National Security

1396
01:38:02,849 --> 01:38:07,379
Advisor, Secretary defense was
on it. Secretary of State at

1397
01:38:07,379 --> 01:38:10,889
that level. I didn't see like
Joint Chiefs of Staff, I saw

1398
01:38:10,919 --> 01:38:14,429
Secretary of the Air Force. But
I didn't see Secretary of the

1399
01:38:14,429 --> 01:38:14,699
Navy

1400
01:38:14,729 --> 01:38:17,069
John Greenewald: and the former
presidents I assume was the they

1401
01:38:17,069 --> 01:38:19,589
were being read through the
Presidential Daily briefs, which

1402
01:38:19,589 --> 01:38:20,369
they still get

1403
01:38:21,570 --> 01:38:26,640
John Ramirez: off that program.
After they leave office.

1404
01:38:26,820 --> 01:38:28,710
John Greenewald: Yeah, you were
saying former? Were you

1405
01:38:28,710 --> 01:38:32,340
referencing president at the
time but former right? Yeah, I

1406
01:38:32,340 --> 01:38:32,970
gotcha. Okay.

1407
01:38:33,210 --> 01:38:35,310
John Ramirez: bigot list
included everyone who has ever

1408
01:38:35,310 --> 01:38:38,400
read into the program. Gotcha.
Okay. So you know, I saw

1409
01:38:38,460 --> 01:38:41,490
Secretary of State, current
Secretary of State former,

1410
01:38:41,760 --> 01:38:44,700
anybody was read in the program
and I short bigger list. My name

1411
01:38:44,700 --> 01:38:48,180
was on it. Gotcha. With my
Social Security and birthday.

1412
01:38:48,570 --> 01:38:51,960
What was the program name? John.
I can say this now because it

1413
01:38:51,960 --> 01:38:55,230
didn't get redacted. Okay, I
can't say the program named but

1414
01:38:55,590 --> 01:38:58,410
the Central Intelligence Agency
in the People's Liberation Army

1415
01:38:58,410 --> 01:39:01,170
of the People's Republic of
China had an intelligence

1416
01:39:01,170 --> 01:39:07,830
sharing agreement, to the point
where the CIA built SIGINT

1417
01:39:07,860 --> 01:39:12,690
collection facilities in China
and trained Chinese officers and

1418
01:39:12,690 --> 01:39:19,110
how to operate our equipment to
collect against Soviet and then

1419
01:39:19,110 --> 01:39:23,100
later Russian ballistic missile
tests. So we were sitting side

1420
01:39:23,100 --> 01:39:27,810
by side with our counterparts in
Chinese intelligence, we

1421
01:39:27,870 --> 01:39:30,900
provided them with a lot of
intelligence that you as an

1422
01:39:30,900 --> 01:39:35,130
American system now can't see.
But there are folks in China,

1423
01:39:35,940 --> 01:39:39,510
our erstwhile adversary that saw
this intelligence where we

1424
01:39:39,510 --> 01:39:42,840
couldn't even share it with our
own American people. Yeah. So

1425
01:39:42,840 --> 01:39:47,220
that's, that's how like, some of
these programs get so deep that

1426
01:39:47,220 --> 01:39:54,390
very few people can be a prized
of it. And even people who would

1427
01:39:54,390 --> 01:39:59,190
have an equity in analyzing that
data, were never given that data

1428
01:40:00,000 --> 01:40:04,890
NSA had it, NSA was apprised of
it, because they are the Signet

1429
01:40:04,890 --> 01:40:07,590
mission Mission Manager. And the
functional Mission Manager for

1430
01:40:07,590 --> 01:40:12,030
sigma is director of NSA turns
up. So in a say was read into

1431
01:40:12,030 --> 01:40:18,480
it. And when I went out there to
travel to be Chief of Operations

1432
01:40:18,480 --> 01:40:22,890
at one of the sites that we
built, my counterpart was NSA.

1433
01:40:24,030 --> 01:40:27,450
But he didn't go us in to say,
he went to CIA, he had to leave

1434
01:40:27,450 --> 01:40:34,920
CIA, NSA temporarily, and get
bashed, you're now in CIA, go

1435
01:40:34,980 --> 01:40:37,680
out there, do your thing, and
then come back. And then we'll

1436
01:40:37,740 --> 01:40:42,300
make use NSA again, also to kind
of like, can't share too many

1437
01:40:42,300 --> 01:40:44,970
operational details. But those
are the kinds of things that we

1438
01:40:44,970 --> 01:40:50,880
have to do, because. But I
didn't see a lot of Dia people

1439
01:40:50,880 --> 01:40:55,530
on it. So using that, as an
extension, it's conceivable that

1440
01:40:55,530 --> 01:40:59,310
a program, they may have fact of
knowledge that we're exploiting

1441
01:40:59,850 --> 01:41:03,180
these vehicles, alien
reproduction vehicles, or

1442
01:41:03,180 --> 01:41:06,720
whatever you want to call them.
The fact of is one thing, but

1443
01:41:06,720 --> 01:41:10,290
knowledge of the programmatics
the funding the logistics,

1444
01:41:11,010 --> 01:41:14,340
that's another whole nother
level. And in our program, we

1445
01:41:14,340 --> 01:41:19,980
use trees. So if you are briefed
on a certain tree, you know, so

1446
01:41:19,980 --> 01:41:24,360
much, if you brief on another
tree, you know, so much more. We

1447
01:41:24,360 --> 01:41:29,070
had a whole bunch of trees. So
you know, if if you owe your

1448
01:41:29,070 --> 01:41:32,490
brief that the Elm level, the
old tree level, or you know,

1449
01:41:32,490 --> 01:41:36,510
this much, I need to brief you
at the oak tree level, you know,

1450
01:41:36,630 --> 01:41:41,490
I mean, it's, that's the kind of
thing you know, so. So that was

1451
01:41:41,490 --> 01:41:47,610
not redacted at all. And I was
surprised that CIA, let me say

1452
01:41:47,610 --> 01:41:50,490
that we had our intelligence
relationship with pizza profit

1453
01:41:50,490 --> 01:41:50,880
China.

1454
01:41:51,420 --> 01:41:55,290
John Greenewald: Yeah. I was not
expecting that when you started

1455
01:41:55,290 --> 01:41:58,650
talking about that. So I'm
surprised. John, I can talk to

1456
01:41:58,650 --> 01:42:02,850
you all day, I hope that you
enjoyed your experience here.

1457
01:42:03,120 --> 01:42:07,500
And, and I really do appreciate
on behalf of my audience, your

1458
01:42:07,500 --> 01:42:10,290
time just coming aboard and
fielding all these questions.

1459
01:42:10,290 --> 01:42:13,170
And let me pick your brain here
for the last 90 minutes or so.

1460
01:42:13,170 --> 01:42:15,900
So thank you for that. And I
hope you'll come back, because

1461
01:42:15,900 --> 01:42:18,750
it sounds like we would have
quite a few more things to talk

1462
01:42:18,750 --> 01:42:19,140
about.

1463
01:42:20,070 --> 01:42:23,970
John Ramirez: Thank you, John.
And you actually, you helped us

1464
01:42:24,750 --> 01:42:28,440
kind of close the loop on our
very first meeting together. And

1465
01:42:28,440 --> 01:42:31,770
I think that's one of the
charming stories of my time at

1466
01:42:31,770 --> 01:42:35,700
CIA is that I actually met you.
And now I'm meeting you in

1467
01:42:35,700 --> 01:42:41,220
providing and sharing some of my
experiences at CIA when I

1468
01:42:41,220 --> 01:42:44,220
couldn't do that when I first
met you. Yeah, I'm happy to

1469
01:42:44,250 --> 01:42:45,330
appear again with you.

1470
01:42:45,360 --> 01:42:47,670
John Greenewald: Thank you.
Yeah. And I appreciate that. And

1471
01:42:47,670 --> 01:42:50,940
thank you all for listening and
watching. Make sure if you are

1472
01:42:50,940 --> 01:42:54,240
on Youtube, just go ahead and
click that thumbs up button. It

1473
01:42:54,240 --> 01:42:56,370
really does help the channel a
lot to make sure you're

1474
01:42:56,370 --> 01:42:59,160
subscribed to the channel as
well. If you're listening on the

1475
01:42:59,160 --> 01:43:02,550
audio podcast platforms, or if
you're not aware, these types of

1476
01:43:02,550 --> 01:43:05,700
interviews get forwarded to
every platform including

1477
01:43:05,910 --> 01:43:10,260
Spotify, iTunes, wherever your
podcast aggregator of choices,

1478
01:43:10,260 --> 01:43:13,380
make sure you look under the
black vault radio. I shoot for

1479
01:43:13,380 --> 01:43:16,800
five stars but reviews very much
help. I won't tell you what to

1480
01:43:16,800 --> 01:43:19,920
put but again, that five star
Mark is what we shoot for. Thank

1481
01:43:19,920 --> 01:43:22,950
you again, John. Thank you all
for listening and watching. This